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Background: There are a number of courses of for workplace accidents. These accidents may result 
in minor or major injuries, equipment damage, and fatalities. The current study examined different 
factors that influence employee participation in workplace safety programs at ImproChem.   
Method: A quantitative study was conducted and a sample of 395 participants was granted an 
opportunity to participate in a survey, with 124 participants completing the survey. An electronic 
questionnaire was administered via QuestionPro after which the results were analyzed.   
Results: The results indicated that there are environmental factors that are barriers to safety 
performance. From the results it was found that 23% of the participants felt that safe working 
procedures were often available rather than being always available. Among the participants 3.2% 
indicated they were unaware of some of the ImproChem safety improvement programs, while 7% 
indicated that they have not received adequate safety training. A difference in safety culture was noted 
across the ImproChem departments. A total of 15.32% of the participants indicated there were no 
rewards associated with achieving a good safety record while other participants indicated that it is rare 
for management to reward safety performance. 70% of the participants indicated that they are afraid 
of making safety related errors. This may be due to the culture of blame and punishment.  
One of the recommendations was to increase employee engagement on workplace safety programs 
aimed at making ImproChem a safe place to work in.   
Conclusion: Employee engagement will increase employee motivation and the extent to which 
employees take ownership of their safety. This will enable ImproChem to reach their goal of “No harm 
to anyone ever” and reduce incident rates within the organization.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 1.1  Introduction  
  
ImproChem forms part of 14 business units under the African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
(AECI) specialty chemical cluster. AECI, being the owner of ImproChem, is a specialty chemicals and 
explosives group originating in South Africa. The aim of AECI is to grow in South America, SouthEast 
Asia and Africa. In order to be aligned with AECI‟s business goal, ImproChem has a wide spectrum 
of customers across South Africa with a long-term plan to saturate Africa. ImproChem operates its 
major sites in Durban and Johannesburg over and above that ImproChem has small operation across 
the country. ImproChem provides energy, water and air solutions that add value to its customers, 
employees, communities as well as its owners. ImproChem is a supplier of specialty chemical raw 
materials and customer service for industrial use in the mining and manufacturing sectors 
(ImproChem, 2015).  
Employees, customers and the well-being of the neighbouring community is of importance to 
ImproChem, as it recognises that a sustainable business cannot operate in isolation. ImproChem has 
necessary precautions in place to ensure that its products do not expose its employees, customers and 
community to any health and safety risks. Safety takes number one priority, even over normal unit 
operation. No work is more important than ImproChem‟s employees‟, customers‟ and the 
community‟s safety. Safety compliance with the legal authorities and the Chemical Service Group 
standard is of utmost importance, as it serves as a foundation on which all ImproChem operations are 
carried out (ImproChem, 2015).   
ImproChem is committed to seeking continuous improvement as far as health, safety, environmental 
and quality (SHEQ) standards are concerned. ImproChem is also willing to work together with the 
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neighbouring communities and customers to ensure safer and healthier products and operational 
procedures. ImproChem‟s leadership team is committed to promote safety at all levels by providing 
appropriate safety training to all ImproChem employees and subcontractors. ImproChem‟s goal is “No 
harm to anyone ever” to ensure alignment with the AECI goal.  
ImproChem was recognised for excellent health and safety results and an outstanding performance on 
safety, health, environmental and quality (SHEQ) standards by AECI in 2013. According to Littlefield 
(2010), many organisations around the world have recently started to demonstrate commitment to 
health and safety projects and programmes. There are many conjecturers of safety performance. In this 
study, the researcher aimed to investigate and clearly articulate methodologies that influence employee 
participation in safety performance.  
Simon and Cistaro (2009:30) make the following statement on safety excellence:   
[S]safety excellence is a product not only of the right programs but also of the 
right culture. Safety policies are the ingredients in the stew-policies, systems and 
processes as the meat and vegetables, while the prevailing culture is the broth. If 
the ingredients are cooking in a wholesome broth – a positive safety culture of 
trust, caring, and responsible leadership – everything works to its potential.  
 1.2  Motivation of the study  
  
According to the Occupational Safe and Healthy Act 1993 (OSH Act), it is the duty of an employer to 
provide a safe and healthy environment for his or her employees as far as reasonable practicable. The 
duty of the employees is to look after their own health and safety and the safety of those who may be 
affected by their actions. Although many studies have been conducted and several safety culture 
models have been developed, there is limited research to validate organisational practices and values 
that have a direct impact on safety performance.  
 1.3  Focus of the study  
  
Different safety culture dimensions were examined across a range of ImproChem departments that 
achieved their safety goals and those that did not achieve their safety goals. The organisational values 
and practices were assessed in connection with the total recordable injury rate (TRIR), fatalities and 
OSH Act (1993) requirements.   
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 1.4  Problem statement  
  
According to Galizzi (2014), risk tolerance and the ability to identify risks reduce the likelihood of 
reoccurrence of incidents and injuries. Karter and Molis (2011) contend that a better understanding of 
why and how the injuries occur can assist in identifying corrective action. Research conducted in South 
Africa by Zohar (2010) reveals that safety performance is affected by job insecurity, dissatisfaction 
and work stress. Chenhall (2010) recommends that safety culture should focus on learning and 
reporting rather than assigning blame. Many studies have been conducted; however, compliance with 
safety requirements is still a challenge in South African industries. The TRIR has not shown any 
improvement in conjunction with investments ImproChem has made to improve workplace safety. The 
number of fatalities and injuries keeps on increasing: The February 2015 TRIR showed an increase of 
0.79 compare to the February 2014 TRIR, which was 0.59 (ImproChem, 2015). The increase was due 
to employees getting injured while performing their tasks and also the number of vehicle accidents 
that occurred while employees were on duty.    
 1.5  Research questions  
  
The research questions were formulated to examine which safety culture types combined with 
organisational values and practices influence safety performance.  
The research questions were formulated as follows:  
1. Does the ImproChem workplace environment (non-human factors) affect employee 
safety performance?  
2. How well do ImproChem employees understand ImproChem safety, health 
environmental and quality (SHEQ) requirements?  
3. How well do ImproChem employees comply with and understand ImproChem SHEQ 
requirements?  
4. Are the employees committed to improve safety within the organisation?  
5. Are the employees provided with sufficient support to reduce safety incidents?  
6. How does the ImproChem safety culture influence employee safety performance?  
 1.6  Research objectives  
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The following research objectives were developed based on the research questions:  
  
1. To assess the extent to which non-human factors (working environment) influence 
employee safety performance.  
2. To evaluate employees‟ level of understanding of ImproChem SHEQ requirements  
3. To evaluate employees‟ level of compliance with ImproChem SHEQ requirements  
4. To evaluate the extent to which employees take ownership of the ImproChem SHEQ 
improvement plan  
5. To evaluate management‟s level of support in ensuring a safe working environment.  
6. To evaluate how organisational culture influences employee participation in ImproChem 
safety measures.  
 1.7  Conclusion   
  
Safety is a critical component in any organisation, which needs to be given the attention it deserves in 
ensuring business success. Every organisation should strive for continuous improvement where safety 
is concerned. Innovative strategies need to be incorporated into existing safety management practices 
to achieve safety excellence. Organisational safety is a broad topic that needs to be studied alongside 
organisational culture, leadership styles, employee attitudes and behaviours, and communication and 
performance management systems. In this research it was noted that culture influences behaviour, thus 
it is important to instil the correct culture in the organisation, which will then align employee values 
and practices to SHE goals. Some of the safety aspects such as attitude are difficult to measure directly, 
therefore it is of advantage to have systems in place that can measure employee safety performance 
and overall organisational safety. The study lays a foundation for future safety studies. The next 

















Chapter 2: Literature review  
  
 2.1  Introduction  
  
The aim of the literature review was to investigate factors influencing employee participation in 
workplace safety programmes, particularly in relation to the case study of ImproChem. Passive 
employee participation in workplace safety programmes results in accidents and an increase in TRIR. 
There has also been an increasing awareness of the direct impact of safety on issues such as business 
profitability, employee productivity, customer perception, shareholder value and operational 
excellence.   
When accidents occur business operations are affected due to the amount of time required to carry out 
investigations and the stand-down periods required to reflect on the incident and realign the workforce 
such that the learning is shared and all employees give their commitment to ensure they carry out their 
tasks in a safe manner that will ensure that similar incidents do not occur (Behm et al., 2004).  
According to Tempesti (2014), risk tolerance and the ability to identify risks affect the reoccurrence 
of incidents and injuries. Karter and Molis (2011) contend that a better understanding of why and how 
the injuries occur can assist in identifying corrective action. Research conducted in South Africa by 
Masia (2011) reveals that safety performance is also affected by job insecurity, satisfaction and work 
stress. Allen and Tebbetts (2013) recommend that safety culture should focus on learning and reporting 
rather than assigning blame. Many studies on safety have been conducted; however, safety compliance 
is still a challenge in the South African industries (Henriqson et al., 2014).  
 In 2014, the TRIR did not improve in line with the investment made by ImproChem to improve 
workplace safety (ImproChem, 2015). There are many recognised indicators that contribute to the 
reoccurrence of accidents. Safety culture and safety climate have been regarded as leading safety 
 
11   
  
indicators, while accidents themselves have been regarded as lagging indicators, as they offer insight 
into the state of safety with no need to further review negative safety outcomes (Chenhall, 2010). The 
study conducted by Robert Cooke and The Reliability Group indicates that there are 80 variables that 
affect accident rates (Allison, 2013). These indicators associated with injuries at work include 
organisational culture and climate, safety culture and safety climate, work environment, 
employeeselection practices, role clarity, and types of work procedures, job satisfaction and stress. A 
similar study by Foster (2013) also revealed five major indicators related to potential causes of safety 
accidents as being environmental, physical, agronomic, psychological and stress. The current review 
is comprised of the high-order concepts such as organisational culture and climate, safety culture and 
climate, and positive safety culture, and proceeds to elaborate on the relationship between 
organisational culture, climate, practices and the safety outcome variables, see figure 2.1 below:  
 2.2  Literature review framework  
  
  
Best safety practice  
1 . Safe behavior motivational and promotional strategies   
2 .Compliance with safety standard policies and  
procedures   
.Support from management 3   
.Orgaisational safety communication(incident and  4 
accident reporting)    
) . Safe work environment (equipment design 5   
Organisational   
safety culture   
Safety  
leadership   
Safety outcome predictors   
.Fatalities 1   
2 .Total recordible incident rate  
( TRIR )   
3 . First - aid injuries   
Safety climate   
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Figure 2.1: Literature review map  
 2.3  Organisational culture  
  
According to Gao (2012), organisational culture refers to the shared perceptions regarding 
organisational norms, values, beliefs, procedures and practices. Organisational culture has appeared to 
be the most significant antecedent of performance in the workplace, as employees‟ perception of the 
organisational structure and state of affairs affect their perception of work behaviour and safety. 
Hecker et al. (2014) state that perceptions of organisational culture influence interactions among 
employees and as a result shape their responses to the work environment and affect their skills training 
activities and levels of motivation. It has been confirmed that a relationships between safety culture, 
organisational culture and safety perception does exist. Barnsteiner (2011) investigated this concept 
and concluded that safety culture is shaped by organisational culture which in turn influences safety 
performance.    
Organisational culture can also refer to attitudes, philosophies, behaviours and beliefs and practices 
that constitute an organisation. Organisational culture makes the organisation unique through many 
characteristics that differentiate the organisation from other organisations (Henriqson et al., 2014). The 
differences may range from internal procedures and policies to public and customer relations. Day-to-
day employee experience is influenced by organisational culture. Organisational culture also 
influences public perception. Brand image and a company‟s culture are closely related to each other, 
informing and reinforcing each other.  
There is consensus among researchers that general organisational culture conveys significant influence 
on safety culture, which tends to influence employee safety behaviour and employee involvement in 
safety incidents.      
Defining organizational culture:  
Chenhall 2010 defines organizational culture as “Systems of shared meanings, assumptions, and 
underlying values”. “Culture is more background and defined by beliefs and values. The level of 
analysis for culture is the organization” (Burke, 2008:184).Chenhall goes on to say “Any social group, 
to the extent that it is a distinctive unit, will have to some degree a culture deferring from that of other 
groups, a somewhat different set of common understandings around which action is organized, and 
these differences will find expression in a language whose nuances are peculiar to that group”  
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“A set of understanding or meanings shared by a group of people. The meanings are largely tactic 
among members, are clearly relevant to the particular group, and are distinctive to the group. Meanings 




 2.4  Organisational climate  
  
Organisational climate has been identified as an important originator of workplace performance, as 
employees‟ perception of the organisational structures and affairs within the organisation shape their 
perceptions and work behaviour (Dollard & Bakker, 2010). Researchers have differentiated 
organisational climate from organisational culture based on the level of analysis – organisational 
climate being more focused on the micro level of the organisation and organisational culture reflecting 
the overall organisation (Chenhall, 2010). Change models and organisational performance, such as 
Tsai (2010) organisational blueprint model clarify the relationship between culture and climate based 
on the macro and micro levels of the organisation. Climate can also be defined as employees‟ 
perceptions and attitudes affecting colleagues‟ day-to-day experience within a team (Zohar, 2010).  
Defining organizational climate:  
According to Ngou et al., (2013) organizational culture is employees‟ perception of their work 
environment, which influences their related behaviours and attitudes. A provision of a frame reference 
by which individuals make sense of organisational life. Burke (2008) states “Climate is the perceptions 
that individuals have of how their local work unit is managed and how effectively they and their day 
to day colleagues work together on the job. The level of analysis is therefore the group, the work unit. 
Climate is much more in the foreground of organizational members‟ perception”  
Bowen and Ostroff (2004, as cited in Ngo et al,2009:669) argues that “strong organizational climate 
affects how employees share a common interpretation of what behaviours are expected and rewarded, 
and hence a situation is created for better organizational performance”. (Davidson et al., 2015) state 
that an individual‟s attitude concerning an organization is a combination of morale, trust, conflict, 
leadership credibility, rewards equity, scapegoating and resistance to change.  
  
 






 2.5  Corporate safety culture  
  
There are many factors that create a structure for human behaviour in the workplace, as discussed 
above. Corporate culture sets restrictions for acceptable human behaviour by establishing behavioural 
limits and norms. Corporate culture serves as a foundation for employee and managerial decision 
making and a blueprint of how things are doing within the organisation (Chib & Kanetkar, 2014).  
Safety culture is therefore a bi-product of corporate culture. Employee corporate attitudes influence 
employees‟ collective approach towards safety (Yule, 2003). The words and actions of senior 
management can set and nurture a positive safety culture. Corporate culture can also be defined as an 
atmosphere that shapes employees‟ attitude towards accident prevention and overall safety measures 
set by management.   
Factors affecting safety culture include:  
• Policies and procedures  
  
Safety policies and procedures demonstrate the commitment management has to their employee‟s 
health and safety. Policies clearly articulate employers and employee‟s responsibilities and 
accountabilities. Compliance with OHS Act (1993) can be ensured if correct policies are in place. 
Safety procedures outline safe work practices to be followed in the workplace to ensure injuries and 
illnesses are prevented.  
• Management‟s actions and priorities  
  
Management‟s actions and priorities need to demonstrate to employees that business performance and 
safety performance and are compatible. The organizations safety principles, beliefs, objective, 
processes and strategies need to be first seen on management level to get buy in through all levels of 
the organization.  
  
 





• Supervisory practices  
  
Safety performance is enhanced when employees feel that their immediate supervisors are concerned 
about their health and safety, supervisors do not push production to the extent of compromising the 
lives of employees. When supervisors address safety concerns and remove safety barriers, employee 
participation in health and safety programmes is guaranteed.  
• Response action to unsafe behaviours   
  
One of the characteristics that build a positive safety culture is the organization‟s response action to 
unsafe behaviours. Research has shown that a culture of blame and punishment is not a suitable culture 
for accident prevention. Actions taken whenever an unsafe behaviour has been identified should 
enhance safety participation rather than instilling fear on the employees. Recently organizations have 
adopted the culture of no name no blame aimed to prevent accidents by removing safety barriers and 
changing employee attitude towards safety.  
• Planning to achieve safety goals  
  
Clearly articulating the organizations safety goals and constantly communicating the plans in place to 
ensure that the set goals are achieved can be a very powerful tool .In this manner employee becomes 
clear on the organization‟s expectations and how they are to contribute toward meeting the safety 
goals.  
• Employee buy-in (involvement)  
  
Good communication is usually related to employee participation and involvement in health and safety 
matters and also to other aspect of the organization (HSE, 2005). Employee buy-in is achieved when 
employees are convinced that their voice counts in the organization. When immediate supervisors and 
management seek safety continuous improvement input across all levels, employees safety climate 
improves which also improves their attitude towards workplace safety. Positive safety culture is also 
promoted within the organization.  
 




• Employee training and motivation.   
  
Employee training and motivation applies to both accident prevention and personal safety. Active 
employees who participate on hazard identification, risk assessment, suggest control measures to 
prevent accidents and incidents. Employees at different levels in the organization should be equipped 
with necessary skills to identify hazards, suggest suitable control measures, provide adequate feedback, 
thus fully taking ownership of workplace safety.  
  
Most researchers point out that the ultimate responsibility for safety lies with management and the 
directors of the organisation. Safety culture is an important aspect as related to safe operation. 
According to Liu et al. (2015), safety culture is a concept which requires urgent attention from 
organisations. Researchers have not reached consensus on defining safety culture, as each individual 
researcher places emphasis on different elements of safety culture. Safety culture is an extremely 
difficult concept to define. Literature provides a wide range of definitions for safety culture. The UK 
Health and Safety Commission (HSE,2005) defines safety culture as the product of individual and 
group perceptions, values, competences, attitudes and patterns of actions that determine the level of 
commitment to, and the proficiency and style of, an organisation‟s safety and health management 
(Dollard & Bakker, 2010).  
Organisations with positive safety culture are characterised by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety and communication built upon mutual trust and by confidence in the effectiveness of 
preventative measures in place (Yule, 2003). A wide range of definitions of safety culture takes into 
consideration group shared values, beliefs and attitudes. Chenhall (2010) reveals that studies have 
shown 2 to 19 safety culture measurements, ranging from management to risk awareness and 
perceptions and attitudes of safety climate. The most often cited measures of safety culture are risk 
awareness and risk taking, leadership style and communication, management and workforce 
commitment, individual responsibility and management responsibility. Research has shown that 
individual human behaviours (safe/unsafe) are shaped by personal attitudes, values and beliefs; 
therefore, workplace safety is founded upon individual and organisational shared beliefs regarding the 
importance of safety (Ungku Fatimah et al., 2014).  
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Henriqson et al. (2014)argue that culture consists of social norms (unspoken rules of behaviour), 
which, if not adhered to, result in conflict. If a workforce reports all procedural irregularities, that is 
an indication of a positive safety norm. Yule (2003) argues that such a norm can only occur in an 
organisation with a reporting culture. A reporting culture can be defined as a culture that allows 
employees to freely report near misses and their errors to management without consequences. A less 
positive safety culture is best represented by a culture that exerts pressure on employee to perform 
tasks even if they can compromise their health and safety (Nielsen, 2014). Understanding the safety 
culture of an organisation, work site or a group as a whole can be difficult, but the most important is 
to identify and understand the dominant safety norms. Identifying and understanding these safety 
norms make it manageable to address specific safety-related issues.  
Definitions of safety culture and safety culture characteristics   
  
Copper (2000); Muniz et.al., (2007) states “Safety culture can be viewed as a component of corporate 
culture, which alludes to individual, job, and organizational characteristics that affect and influence 
health and safety”.  
Characteristic of safety culture  
• Job features  
• Individual features  
• Affect and influence health and safety  
• Organisational characteristics  
  
According to (Haukelid, 2008:416) “Safety culture should not be something separate from or in 
addition to an organizational culture, but constitutes an integrated part of this”.Haukelid (2008) 
believes that the characteristics of safety culture are an integrated part of organizational culture.  
Cabrera et al.,(2007:1203) states “Safety culture can be construed to be manifested in shared values 
and meanings, and in particular organizational structure and processes, strategies, safety policies, 
goals, practices, leadership styles related to safety management systems”.  
Characteristic of safety culture  
• Shared meanings and values  
• Particular organizational structure  
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• Processes   
• Strategies  
• Policies  
• Goals  
• Practices   
• Leadership styles  
  
Muniz et al., 2007:628 defines safety culture as “Positive safety culture is a set of values, attitudes, 
perceptions, and patterns of behaviour with regards to safety shared by members of an organization, 
as well as a set of policies, procedures and practices relating to reduction of employees‟ exposure to 
occupational risks, implemented at every level of the organization, and reflecting a high level of 
concern and commitment to the prevention of illnesses and accidents.”  
Characteristic of safety culture  
• Value  
• Attitudes  
• Perceptions  
• Patterns of behaviour   
• Policies  
• Procedures  
• Practices  
• Reduction of exposure to occupational risk  
• Commitment in prevention of illness and accidents  
  
Ahmad& Gibb,2003:30 states “Safety culture can be defined as set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, social 
technical practices that are aimed to minimize individuals exposure within and beyond an organization, 
to conditions considered injurious and dangerous.”  
Characteristic of safety culture  
• Beliefs   
• Attitudes  
• Norms  
• Social technical practices  
 




 2.6  Safety climate  
  
According to Kapp (2012), safety climate can be defined as a climate for physical health and safety 
that predicts individual safety behaviour, injury to health and industrial accidents. Dollard and Bakker 
(2010) define safety climate as employees‟ perception of management‟s performance and 
commitment with regard to safety procedures, policies and practices. Researchers have found that 
employees with negative perceptions of the safety climate (work pressure, high workload) are highly 
likely to engage in unsafe acts, which then lead to accidents, whereas with employees with positive 
perceptions of the safety climate, safety compliance does not become an issue, and as a result, few 
accidents are registered.   
Another important factor is the perception employees have about their organisation. If employees 
perceive their organisation as a concerned, caring and supportive organisation with regard to employee 
well-being, it increases their levels of job satisfaction, and therefore employees are encouraged to take 
ownership of their own safety (Bakker, 2010). Safety culture and safety climate are closely related, as 
shared aspects are stressed in both concepts. The main difference is that safety culture looks into the 
shared values, beliefs and attitudes towards the organisation and the work in general, while safety 
climate looks closely into operations and daily employee perception of working practices, work 
environment, and management and organisational practices. The definitions may have common 
elements, as safety climate may imitate the fundamental culture of an organisation; however, its focus 













Table 2.1: Safety climate characteristics   
Authors  Characteristic of safety culture  
Wachter and Yorio (2013)  Risk level, attitude, importance of training, 
status of safety personnel, effects of safe 
behaviour on promotion  
Huang et al. (2012)  Communication and support  
 Work pressure  
 Relevant procedures  
 Personal protection team  
 Relations  
 Safety norms  
Du and Sun (2012)  
Yeow and Goomas (2014)  
Commitment of management  
 Support from co-workers  
 Support from supervisors  
 Level of competence  
 Employee participation  
  
Lu and Tsai (2010)  Work environment safety  
 Safety management  
 Safety training  
 Job safety   
 Safety of co-workers  
 Job pressure  
 Safety norms  
  
Chang and Wang (2010)  
Kapp (2012)  
Management communication and 
commitment  
 Plant maintenance  
 Safety training  
 
21   
  
Gao (2012)  Leadership safety  
 Safety instructions  
  Commitment to safety  
 Safety leadership of immediate 
supervisors  
 Attention to safety violations  
 Leadership support   
  
According to Chenhall (2010), a positive safety culture in an organisation is a foundation that interlinks 
with organisational culture. Mathis (2009) asserts that the „culture of safety‟ should not be separate 
from „traditional safety‟. The safety climate, in simpler terms, is a sub-element of safety culture, which 
relates to individual and group behaviours and attitudes in engaging with safe practices. A positive 
safety culture is a by-product of personal and group attitudes, values and perceptions, and an extension 
of safety climate inclusive of commitment to safety, values and trust.  
According to O‟Connor et al. (2011), safety climate can be defined as employee safety perceptions 
and attitudes at any given point in time with an intention to identify system weaknesses and 
safetyimprovement opportunities. In both safety culture and safety climate there is strong emphases 
on shared values and beliefs with regard to safety.  
 2.7  Positive safety culture  
  
Compliance with safety regulations is a basic requirement to ensure safety; however, compliance on 
its own is not enough. Employees who simply comply with the minimum safety requirements are not 
likely to be able to identify potential hazards before they result in accidents. To be able to promote 
safe operations, employees themselves ought to have a positive attitude towards safety (Bakker, 2010). 
All employees must be able to put their safety and that of their fellow employees first. Every employee 
in the organisation, whether the field service technicians, the sales technologist or director, must have 
the same mind-set with regard to safety. All their decisions must consider safety implications.  
A top-down approach is essential to driving a positive safety culture within the organisation; the 
approach must be based on mutual trust and respect between employees and management. Employees 
must believe management have their best interest at heart with regard to safety and also understand 
that there is zero tolerance for unsafe behaviour. It is important for management to be able to ensure 
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employees that their safety comes first before schedule delivery and the profits of the organisation 
Chenhall (2010).  
Positive safety culture indicators include the following  
  
• Senior management must place strong emphasis on safety for risk management.  
• Operational personnel and decision makers must hold a realistic view of the short- and longterm 
organisational activities with hazardous safety implications.  
• Senior management is responsible for implementing safety measures to contain identified safety 
hazards.  
• A climate with a positive attitude towards safety criticism, feedback and comments from the 
lower level of the organisation must be fostered.  
• Positive employee views with regard to safety should be encouraged.  
• A non-punitive working environment that tolerates legitimate errors and derives systematic 
safety lessons should be encouraged by senior management.   
• Relevant safety awareness communication and information should be shared at all levels, within 
and outside the organisation.  
• Relevant training should be offered to employees, ensuring full understanding of consequences 
of unsafe behaviour.    
• Zero tolerance of at-risk behaviour should be clearly communicated, with the aim of 
discouraging such behaviour (Bakker, 2010).  
  
According to Chenhall (2010), positive safety culture consists of the following:  
An informed culture: Employees are provided with the opportunity to develop relevant skills, 
knowledge and experience to carry out their duties in a safe manner, and are encouraged to report 
underlying safety threats and to contribute to necessary solutions to overcome them. Management 
becomes responsible for fostering a culture in which employees understand the hazards and risks 
associated with their operations.  
A learning culture: Learning is considered as a fundamental requirement for primary skills training 
and should be a process and not a programme. Employees are encouraged to apply their already 
acquired skills and also develop new skills and knowledge to enhance workplace safety. Management 
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constantly sends out safety reports and feedback as means of updating employees of current safety 
issues. Employees are also encouraged to learn relevant safety lessons from such reports and feedback.  
A reporting culture: Employees and managers freely share critical safety issues and information with 
no threat of being punished. Employees are able to report near misses and hazards with no fear of being 
embarrassed.   
A just culture: Even though a non-punitive environment is essential for a good reporting culture, the 
boundaries should be clear and employees should know what behaviour is acceptable and what is 
inacceptable. There should be zero tolerance for deliberate safety violations and negligence either by 
employees or management. The just culture recognises that there are certain circumstances that require 
punitive action. Employees are likely to be self-disciplined in a just culture.  
Table 2.2 below summarises three different safety cultures and their related organisational responses 
to safety issues. The table shows a poor safety culture, a bureaucratic approach, which only achieves 
minimum safety requirements, and lastly a positive culture.  
Table 2.2: Features of different safety cultures adapted from Guldenmund (2010).  
Safety culture features  Poor  Bureaucratic  Positive  
Information relating to  
hazards is:  
Suppressed  Ignored  Actively sought  
Safety messengers are:  Punished or 
discouraged  
Tolerated  Encouraged and 
trained  
Safety responsibility is:  Avoided  Fragmented  Shared  
Distribution of safety 
information is:  
Discouraged  Allowed, however 
discouraged  
Rewarded  
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New ideas for safety are:  Crushed  Seen as new 
problems, not an 
opportunity to  
Applauded  
  improve   
  
2.7.1            Error tolerance   
  
Error tolerance can be defined as the capability of a system to accept errors with no consequences 
(Gao, 2012). The organisation‟s attitude towards safety errors is an important dimension of positive 
safety culture. Employees‟ perception of how to respond to errors is also determined by the 
organisation‟s attitude. The „error tolerance‟ concept was first discovered and applied to the 
ergonomic design of equipment, which compared inappropriate human acts against physical defects 
(Wachter & Yorio, 2014). Procedural actions such as checklists and last hazardous risk assessments 
cater for error tolerance, as unsafe conditions are identified before a calamity occurs. The idea of error 
tolerance is increasingly being extended further than job and equipment design to the organisational 
safety culture.  
To create a positive safety culture, effective two-way communication is a fundamental requirement 
between the frontline leaders and management itself. The value of incident-reporting systems that 
provide protection to the reporter is now recognised by many organisations (Ahmad et al, 2012).  The 
effectiveness of a reporting culture is highly dependent on the error tolerance of the organisation. Some 
organisations have lifesaving rules, where there is zero tolerance for individuals who breach those 
rules.  
2.7.2             Punishment and blame   
  
During investigations, a root cause for any occurrence is identified and it becomes evident who or what 
caused the event (Ahmad et al, 2012). Conventionally, punishment and blame could then be assigned. 
The legal requirements differ from country to country; however, it is common that during 
investigations more focus will be on allocating liability and assigning blame. Punishment still remains 
the major tool.  
Theoretically, punishment is defined as an act of:  
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• Setting an example for fellow employees;  
• Protecting employees/society from a repeat of incidents;  
• Seeking revenge for breaking the rules; or  
• Changing individual behaviour.   
  
Punishment may have a huge role in correcting violations where employees disobey the „rules‟. On 
the other hand, such acts may discourage the wrongdoer (individual who has violated the rules) and 
jeopardise safe operations. In principle, punishment should be given equally, irrespective of the 
outcome of the breach of safety violations.  
In the event where an accident resulted from pure misjudgement or a technical error, it becomes 
impossible to assign punishment for that particular error. The only practical thing to do in such 
incidents would be to change the training process or to make the system more tolerant of technical 
errors. The only risk of increasing the error tolerance would be the likelihood of the reoccurrence of 
the error. Where nothing has been done to correct the situation, usually there are no reports issued 
related to that particular error.  
Global research suggests that there is little, if any, systematic value derived from punishment with 
regard to accident prevention. Punishment can possibly be an option in cases where an employee 
deliberately violated the norms; however, for proactive response to accident prevention, organisations 
require more than mere punishment (Haung et al., 2015).   
Most chemical industries are gaining insight into the role of punishment (Ahmad et al, 2012).  There 
is increasing understanding of the sources of human errors. Errors are currently viewed as outcomes 
of circumstances or particular situations. This has resulted in managers seeking out unsafe conditions 
to do away with such errors. Managers have come to understand that the costs associated with safety 
deficiencies are much higher than the costs of punishing individuals. This realisation does not mean 
employees have to be complacent; there should be improvement in their behaviour after training has 
been provided (Tsai, 2011).  
Even though many chemical industries have adopted the positive approach to safety management, there 
are some that are lagging behind in implementing the „non-punitive policies‟.  
2.7.3               Accident and incident context   
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Accidents and incidents occur due to certain circumstances and conditions. Such circumstances and 
conditions include aspects such as equipment, environmental conditions and human behaviour. At 
times, these factors join, such that a suitable environment for accidents is created. Effective safety 
management implies understanding of the background in which an accident occurred. Some of the 
major factors that shape the background for incidents and accidents include supporting infrastructure, 
equipment design, job design, cost factors, organisational culture, and cultural and human factors 
(Wachter et al., 2013).  
2.7.4                 Situational factors: Equipment design  
  
Job and equipment design are fundamental to safe operation. The designer should be satisfied that the 
equipment:  
• performs the task it is designed for;  
• is easy to operate in a user-friendly manner; and  
• has safeguards to ensure the operator is safe at all times.  
  
The equipment designer should at all times also consider the safety of the maintenance personnel. The 
equipment must have adequate surrounding space to allow easy access for repairs under normal 
operating conditions. The equipment should also have prompting alarms to warn the maintenance 
personnel in case of incorrect assembly.   
The equipment operator should be satisfied that the equipment can deliver as per the design 
specifications. Ergonomic design should serve as a safeguard to minimise the consequences/risks of 
error, for example access to switches. With current technological advances, most equipment is now 
automated. The increase in automation has somehow reduced the potential of accidents, as the 
equipment sends warning signals before an accident occurs (Allison, 2013). However, this has affected 
operator situational awareness, as the operators rely fully on the computers.  
2.7.5            Human factors  
  
Although most chemical industries have moved to high technology, accidents still occur. On average, 
three out of four accidents occur due to human errors, and accidents are often caused by highly 
qualified individuals. In the process of embracing new technology, the human component of 
individuals who will be operating the equipment must not be overlooked.   
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There are quite a number of factors influencing human errors contributing to accidents; these may be 
poor operating instructions, poor equipment design and procedure design, and inadequate training. 
Whatever the case may be, it is important to understand that human performance limitations, 
capabilities and behaviour in the operational background are core to understanding safety management. 
A spontaneous approach to human factors is no longer adequate (Chenhall, 2010).  
As adaptable and flexible as the human element can be in the chemical industry, it is also defenceless 
to effects that can undesirably affect its performance. Inasmuch as most accidents occur from lessthan-
optimal human performance, it has been said they were due to human error. The word „human error‟ 
has not been of any assistance in safety management; although it relays a message of system 
breakdown, it does not clarify why the accident occurred. In most cases, this term may allow for a 
suppression of the primary factors that must be addressed to ensure accident prevention.  
In any accident prevention and investigation, contemporary safety thinking allows for human error to 
be the preliminary step, not the stopping point (Jiang, 2014). For an effective safety-management 
system, initiatives to prevent and minimise human errors that have a potential to threaten safety must 
be sought. This entails understanding factors and conditions that affect human performance in the 
workplace, refer to figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2: Factors and conditions that affect human safety performance in the workplace 
(adapted from Wachter et al., 2013)  
  
Figure 2.2 provides a summary of factors and conditions that affect human safety performance. All 
these conditions and factors either negatively influence human safety performance. Good safety 
programs, training and processes can reduce human related errors. Positive safety culture within the 
organization encourages employees to perform their activities safely, paying attention to all possible 
hazards that can serve as barriers to safety performance. Equipment design and work environment have 
a big role in reducing human errors thus preventing accident. There are also personal factors that can 
affect human safety performance such as the employee wellbeing, hence many organizations also offer 
employee wellness programs to assist employees deal with their personal issues so they can have 
undivided attention when performing their tasks.  
2.8.1           Safety- management system  
  
An effective safety-management system involves processes, programmes, procedures and policies that 
have a formal function responsible for their advancement, implementation and day-to-day 
administration. According to Wachter et al. (2013) safety-management systems cannot be considered 
as a form of context contained from perceptual processes of employees such as management 
commitment and safety climate. Measures such as employee participation or sense of workplace justice 
that affect employee perception can be considered as outcomes of neutral safety-management system 
practices in place.  
The aim of the safety-management system is to influence employee skills, knowledge, decision 
making, motivation, perceptions and attitudes. These systems are also designed with the aim of 
ensuring that the organisation gains competitive advantage through the utilisation of strategic, synergic 
systems of unified safety practices designed for employee safety and zero incidents. The research 
conducted by Foster (2013) reveals that there is a set of 10 formalised safety practices in organisations 
that are leaders in human performance. These practices are pre- and post-task reviews (last-minute risk 
assessments), employee involvement, hiring for safety, safe work procedures, organisational facilities, 
safety training, accident investigations, information sharing, deviation, detection and monitoring, and 
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2.8.2          SHEL model  
  
According to Zohar (2010), workplace safety is a combination of interrelated conditions and factors 
that have the potential to affect human performance. The SHEL model has been identified as a tool to 
visualise the interconnection between various components, especially within the aviation system. As 
safety is common across all industries, such a tool can also be applied within the chemical industry. 
This model was developed from the old-fashioned „man-machine-environment‟ system. The SHEL 
model focuses more on humans and their interfaces with many other aviation system components.  The 
SHEL model can be decoded as follows:  
• Support, procedures and training – software (S)  
• Equipment and machine – hardware (H)  
• Operational boundaries and circumstances where the Live-Hardware-Software system 
functions – environment (E)  
• Humans in the workplace – liveware (L), Zohar (2010).  
 2.9  Types of errors  
  
Errors may occur at different stages of the process, either at the initial stage or at the implementation 
stage. Errors that occur at the initial stage often lead to mistakes, whereby operators end up following 
an incorrect procedure when performing their routine tasks or create an inappropriate contingency plan 
to deal with a new situation. It is possible to have an appropriate initial plan; however, errors may 
occur in the implementation phase. According to the literature, human errors in the implementation 
phase give clarity between lapses and slips (Nielsen, 2014). A slip can be defined as an action that did 
not go according to plan, and therefore it is noticeable. A lapse, on the other hand, can be defined as 
memory failure. Most of the time it may not be visible to any other individual except for the individual 
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2.9.1               Errors in the planning phase   
  
Whenever human beings are faced with challenges that require solutions, it is common to intuitively 
rely on a set of rules such as the standard operating procedures that have been applied before for a 
similar challenge. Errors may occur in two different ways, when a flawed rule is correctly applied or 
when there is inappropriate application of a certain rule for that particular situation (Nielsen, 2014).  
  
• Good rules misapplied: This usually occurs when an individual is dealing with a challenge with 
similar features to the circumstances that the rule was proposed for, but carrying a major 
difference.  
• Bad rules applied: This happens when a procedure that has been applied in the past and has 
been proven to work is applied with no recognition that the procedure comprises of 
unrecognised flaws. Past experience usually conditions individuals to have a similar approach 
to problem solving.  
  
On the other hand, where there is no ready-made procedure or solution derived from past experience 
it is common that individuals draw from their personal experience and knowledge (Foster, 2013). 
Developing new solutions from personal experience inevitably requires more time than applying 
solutions based on standard rules simply because new solutions require a cognitive approach founded 
upon knowledge of basic doctrines. Fault reasoning and lack of knowledge of such cases can lead to 
mistakes. It tends to be a challenge to apply the knowledge-based reasoning when an individual has 
divided attention. This can be due to the high work load or other personal issues, which cause 
employees to divert their attention from the reasoning process to other issues to be dealt with. In such 
circumstances there is high probability of the errors occurring.   
  
2.9.2           Errors in the implementation phase (slips and lapses)   
  
Competent and experienced individuals tend to have highly practised and routine actions. These 
actions are usually carried out using the subconscious mind (automatic fashion) and may only differ 
for random checks on progress. The main reasons for slips and lapse are:  
  
• Attention slips: This occurs when individuals fail to monitor routine action progress at critical 
points. This is evident when the action plan is somehow similar yet not identical to the routine 
procedure. If distractions occur at the critical steps where the procedure differs from  
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the action plan, the individual may automatically follow the procedure rather than the current 
action plan.  
• Memory lapse: This occurs when an action plan item is omitted or an individual forgets the 
action plan.  
• Errors from perception: These are errors from recognition, when individuals are convinced 
they heard or saw dissimilar information from the actual information presented (Allison, 2013).  
  
2.9.3             Violations versus errors  
   
Violations are different from errors, although both can lead to system failures and accidents. The only 
distinguishing factor is the intent. An error occurs unintentionally, while a violation is done 
intentionally. For example, in most refineries mobile devices (cell phones) are not allowed in the 
process area because they can interfere with the processes. If an individual deliberately takes his or her 
cell phone to the unit to receive calls, that is a pure violation, and violations should not be tolerated. 
On the other hand, if an individual forgets his or her cell phone in his or her pockets and go to the unit, 
and immediately exits the process area as soon as he or she realises the cell phone is in his or her 
pocket, it qualifies as an error (Foster 2013) .Organisational cultures that tolerate violations and 
promote taking short cuts instead of following procedures have a high rate of total recordable cases.   
2.9.4              Control of human error  
  
Errors can lead to more severe consequences than just accidents. It is important to understand that 
human behaviour is subject to errors, therefore complete elimination of human error would be an 
unrealistic goal. The main challenge thereof will not be total error elimination; it would be to 
familiarise individuals with ways of safely managing the inevitable errors.   
  
According to literature there are three strategies for human error management. These strategies are 
applicable and relevant to the chemical industry (McKenna 2010):   
   
• Error reduction:  This strategy allows for direct intervention in the source of the human error 
by method of elimination or reduction of contributing factors to the error. Any conditions that 
increase the risk of error are eliminated. This will include making the workplace environment  
as safe as possible for individuals to perform their tasks safely, in other words relating to the 
maintenance of machinery and the elimination of potential hazards in the work area.  
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• Error capturing: This is an assumption made that the error has already occurred, with the 
intention to capture the error before any undesirable consequences occur due to the error. Error 
capturing and reduction differ in the sense that error capturing is not directly aimed eliminating 
or reducing error. Error capturing comprises of crosschecking for verification of correct task 
completion.   
• Error tolerance: The ability of a system to agree to take an error without severe 
























 2.10  Accident-prevention cycle  
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The accident-prevention process begins with understanding the context in which accidents occur. An  
effective safety-management system is required for accident prevention. Figure 2.3 represents a typical 
required safety process for accident prevention:    
 
Figure 2.3 Accident-prevention cycle (adapted from O'Connor et al., 2011)  
  
effective safety-management system is required for accident prevention. Figure 2.3 represents a typical required safety process for accident prevention:   
The critical step in safety management is hazard identification. Evidence of hazards can be found from 
different sources by a number of ways such as the following:  
• Incident- and hazard-reporting system  
• Follow-up and investigation on reported hazards and incidents  
• Analysis of trends  
• Feedback from safety training  
• Operational safety surveys and audits  
• Monitoring of equipment and line operations  
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Every identified hazard has to be prioritised and evaluated. This involves gathering data, after which 
the data are assed to examine the extent of the hazard (systematic or one of a kind). Data analysis is 
then done using appropriate tools (O'Connor et al., 2011). When safety deficiencies have been 
validated, an appropriate action to eliminate or reduce the hazard must be decided upon. It is important 
to ensure that the proposed solution does not introduce new hazards.  
Upon implementation of the appropriate safety action, performance monitoring is essential to ensure 
the desired results are achieved. The accident-prevention process requires constant change.  
Management must therefore be responsible for change management.  
 2.11  Safety leadership  
   
Leadership is a critical aspect in ensuring that safety goals are achieved. Researchers have studied 
safety leadership with the aim of examining the full range model of transactional and transitional 
leadership behaviours in supervisors and managers. Monitoring and rewards are transactional leader 
behaviours. Transformational leader behaviours are fixed towards genuinely motivating and inspiring 
the workforce. Through transformation leadership safety behaviour or performance can be encouraged 
simply because the transformational leaders motivate employees to contribute more to the 
organisational and group goals than for immediate personal gain (Tsai et al., 2011).  
According to Hersey Blanchard‟s leader effectiveness model, there are two dimensions with regard to 
relationship behaviour and task behaviour that are represented by the leadership styles of executives. 
These dimensions were separated into „telling, selling, participating and delegating‟ (Chenhall, 2010). 
For leadership to be effective, it must be adaptable. According to Dollard and Bakker (2010), the 
multilevel model of safety climate aimed to examine the link between group-level and organisational-
level factors that have an impact on climate. Management style were found to have an influence on 
climate and were categorised as commitment, compliance and participation; they were further 
classified as proactive, dynamic and declarative, which link with organisationallevel climate types.  
According to Sun et al. (2012), at times managers claim to embrace particular values through lip 
service, referring to goals, strategies and philosophies; however, their actions may not be aligned with 
their spoken values. For instance, a manager may claim safety comes first, but neglects to apply safety 
policies in cases where he believes certain units may close down if productivity is not maximised. 
Furthermore, the same manager may reward employees for increased production volumes, paying less 
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attention to safety aspect. Such managers are considered to have a producer leadership style, driven by 
motivating employees to complete their tasks with little or no consideration of safe work practices.   
Several researchers have examined the effects of safety leadership on safety climate. Wu et al. 
(2008:309) state that “safety leadership is the process of interaction between leaders and followers, 
through which leaders can exert their influence on followers to achieve organizational safety goals 
under circumstances of organizational and individual factors”.  
Transformational leadership is believed to be future-oriented, as it focuses on future development; it 
has also been referred to as relationship-oriented leadership. Transactional leadership pays more 
attention to linking rewards with performance; it is often referred to as task-oriented leadership.  
Previous research by Wachter et al. (2013) focused on three dimensions of safety leadership, namely 
active transformational leadership, safety monitoring and safety motivation. They found that safety 
motivation and active management are characteristics of transformational leadership, and safety 
monitoring was found to be closely linked to transactional leadership. Safety motivation looks into the 
degree to which senior management creates clear responsibilities, missions and goals for setting high 
safety behaviour standards for employees or puts relevant safety systems into place to correct employee 











 2.12  Questionnaire related to safety culture practices and values  
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Dejoy et al. (2010) adopted a safety culture model to learn five safety values and practices, which they 
believe are related to safety performance, as previously indicated by multi-studies on safety culture.  
• Leadership style  
• Company values  
• Training programmes   
• Motivation patterns   
• Use of accident and incident information and communication.  
Research by Hofmann (2011) and Diaz (1997) indicated that safety climate is the originator of the 
development of relevant questionnaires on organisational safety culture practices and values. The study 
examined the relationship between accident rates and safety climate for an airport groundhandling 
organisation. The questionnaire was administered to operators, managers, airport authorities and 
service companies for ground-handling in Spain. The analysis of the results revealed that there are six 
safety climate factors. The most important dimension of safety culture identified was company policy, 
which carried 38% of the safety culture variance. Emphasis placed by the organisation on productivity 
rather than safety accounted for 6.4% variance in safety culture. The following dimensions of climate 
and attitude were measured Hofmann (2011):  
• Organisational policy/strategy with regard to safety matters  
• Importance of productivity against that of safety  
• Group safety attitudes  
• Strategies related to accident prevention  
• Perceived safety level in the workplace  
• Perceived safety level in individual tasks performed.  
There was a significant difference noted on the level of safety performance for the three companies 
according to F(2.56) p < 0.1. Ten years later, another questionnaire was administered to measure safety 
culture through:  
• Leadership style  
• Company values  
• Training programmes  
• Motivation strategies  
• Use of accident and incident information  Communication.  
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The questions were designed such that they measured beyond individual attitudes and perceptions of 
accident- and incident-reporting system objectives, methods for requesting feedback and the use of 
feedback. The questionnaire was adapted from the research of Cameron and Quinn (2014), which 
revealed how organisational practices such as accident- and incident-reporting systems can be 
approached depending on the organisational culture. To ensure compliance with procedures and 
policies a policy-oriented safety culture, which deals with a reporting system, can be adopted. 
Contrary, in a supportive environment the aim of a reporting system would be to motivate and increase 
safety commitment according to the type of motivation, values and safety culture.  
Based on the studies and findings presented, the current study examined five independent variables 
relating to organisational values and practices. The TRIR, recordable lost-time injury (RLTI), firstaid 
injuries and fatalities served as dependent variables, which were used as a measure of safety 
performance. From the review of literature it is evident that most studies on safety culture are usually 
presented as an assessment of commitment and values relating to safety on company as well as group 
level. On the other hand, Diaz and Cabrera (1997) examined employee attitudes related to safety by 
looking at different levels in the organisation. The study compared employee safety attitude at 
company, management, middle-management and operator level to explore differences in safety 
attitudes and climate. The current study also examined the variations in safety climate by job 
classification and plant. According to Chenhall (2010), individuals who are mostly exposed to risk 
have less positive attitudes than employees who are not. A study of both situational and individual 
factors was done.  
In most of the studies reviewed, the aim was to determine safety practices, such as safety 
communication and training, which result in a positive safety climate. The study by Wachter et al. 
(2013) revealed some of the dimensions of particular practices that relate to positive safety culture. 
According to Richer and Koch (2004), Many scholars have an integrative, unitary and monolithic 
move towards to culture. Indicators of safety performance or dependent variables for the true current 
study also only include TRIR, RLTI, first-aid injuries and fatalities. Company leadership style, values, 
safety information sharing and motivation are treated as independent variables. The culture systems 
discussed are the reporting culture, learning culture, just culture and informed culture.   
  
 2.13  Conceptual framework  
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Several culture models were selected for a conceptual framework due to the lack of empirical research 
differentiating between safety outcomes and corresponding types of safety culture. Most research 
indicates that organisational culture is shaped by certain organisational practices (Bamsteiner, 2011; 
Guldenmud, 2013; Hecker et al., 2014). Cabrera (2007) points out five organisational practices that 
are the most significant in research on safety culture. The competing values framework by Cameron 
and Quinn (2014:12) “can be useful in organizational analysis, in the analysis of organizational change, 
and in the guidance of practitioners in the execution of organizational development interventions”.  
Nadler and Tushma‟s organisational behaviour diagnosis (cited in Argorte, 2012) and BurkeLitwin‟s 
model of organisational performance and change (Allen & Tebbetts, 2013) emphasise culture 
consistency. These models served as theoretical foundation of the current study. The theoretical 
structure of assumptions (conceptual framework) that supported this study clarified the safety culture 
practices and value developments which served as diagnostic instruments to examine the current 
organisational safety culture state of ImproChem.  
Figure 3.3 shows how different management styles impact the safety outcome such as the number of 
first aid injuries, the number of fatalities, and the overall total recordable incident rate. Supportive and 











Figure 3.3: Safety culture models (Diaz et al., 2010) Adapted from Cameron & Quinn 1999.  
In organisational effectiveness models there are four types of safety culture, namely supportive, 
innovative, goal-oriented and policy culture. Supportive culture is recognised by employee 
collaboration, involvement and team building as means of encouraging organisational safety 
commitment. A supportive culture ensures that after every incident employees together with 
management identify training needs to close the gap specific to that incident. An innovative safety 
culture is recognised by its flexibility to change, job design, reward system and work procedures to 
ensure safety improvement, as employees give feedback on where change is required. Goal-oriented 
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The policy-oriented culture merely evaluates the consequences of safety failures and safety 
performance for compliance purposes only. The study applied a similar framework to assess and 
measure variation in safety performance with the aim of reducing incidents and accident (Diaz et.al, 
2010).  
This conceptual framework can be used to point out areas of improvement after analysis of the safety 
profile results. Safety culture profiles adopted from the value frameworks of Cabrera et al. (2013) and 
Cameron and Quinn (2014) can be used to comprehend the safety culture components and identify 
gaps in different departments.  
Organisational practices that include company values, communication, leadership style and 
motivation, and use of incident and accident information were used to understand culture types across 
the departments of ImproChem and determine whether the organisation is typified by flexibility and 
discretion or stability and control, as shown in Figure 3.3.  
 2.14  Conclusion  
  
Scholars have not been able to reach consensus as to which safety performance measures should be 
used as measures of safety culture. Some researchers argue that the reduction in accident and incident 
rate provides the best measure of safety culture. This is due to the fact that not all employees report 
incidents and near misses either due to fear of punishment or because they do not want to miss out on 
free safety incentive gifts (Allen & Tebbetts, 2013). Therefore, incident rates cannot be treated as an 
accurate measure of safety performance. According to the OSH Act of 1993, it is the duty of the 
employee to report illnesses and injuries that are work-related before the end of each shift. However, 
some employees still do not report injuries and illnesses (OSH Act, 1993). Some injuries can be 
difficult to link with particular working conditions over a specific period of time, and as a result they 
are not reported.  
Safety performance indicators are classified differently under the OSH Act. There are leading and 
lagging safety performance indicators. Leading are those proactive measures of safe behaviours that 
show employee engagement with workplace safety improvement, tasks and analysis of hazards. 
Lagging indicators are those reactive measures that indicate the number of incidents and form part of 
safety performance indicators. Zou et al. (2013) worked on a safety culture model for a construction 
organisation. The outcome variables were to increase safe behaviours through the reduction of incident 
rate. The model is suitable for an organisation that uses a behavioural-based safety programme to 
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clearly define safe and at-risk behaviours with regard to company procedures, policies and risk 
assessments.  
It is still not been clear whether the referenced independent variables are suitable predictors of safety 
performance. Very little study has been done to investigate which variables are contributors to specific 
culture performance. Therefore, the current study explored independent variables that extend beyond 
procedures and policies to include individual and organisational values and practices. Based on the 
organisational culture theory, the study investigated the missing link between types of safety culture 
and safety outcome predictors. The next chapter contains the research methodology, detailed 
information regarding the on the population, sample size, questionnaire design will be given. Data 













Chapter 3: Research methodology   
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 3.1  Introduction  
  
The literature review chapter was done in order to investigate factors influencing employee 
participation in workplace safety programmes. Safety culture, safety climate, non-human factors and 
organisational culture and other dependant variables were identified as contributing factors to low 
employee commitment to safety improvement.  
The objective of this research was to investigate the relationship between safety culture, safety climate 
and organisational culture, and human and non-human factors that affect employee enthusiasm to 
participate in workplace safety-improvement programmes. The aim was also to assess the role of these 
factors in safety performance indicators. A detailed description of factors influencing employee 
participation on safety performance was done, making this a descriptive study. According to 
McDonald (2014), in such a study the emphasis should be on an in-depth description of situation, 
group, individual and organisation.   
 3.2  Research design methods  
  
According to Bamsteiner (2011), the research design is a detailed plan/blueprint of how a research 
study will be conducted with regard to data collection, determining the basis of hypotheses and data 
analysis. The research design determines the success or failure of the research. Huang (2012) states 
that surveys give quantitative information with regard to groups and descriptive features of individuals. 
He further states that the deductive approach is highly recommended, as the researcher instigates a 
theoretical research problem before embarking on data analysis and empirical measurements.   
Chenhall (2010) mentions the debate over quantitative and qualitative methodologies for learning 
about organisational culture. It has been found that studies employing quantitative research have been 
utilised to describe and understand cultures. The limitation in utilising electronic questionnaires is the 
poor response rate; however, it covers a wide geographic area (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). As the aim 
of the current study was to understand factors influencing employee participation in workplace safety 
programmes, a comparison of different dimensions of organisational practices across different 
departments in the organisation was essential.  
 3.3  Location of the study  
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The study was conducted at ImproChem KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Cape Town and Johannesburg in 
South Africa, and Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The research focused on different 
departments within the organisation such as the energy division, production, marketing, human capital, 
safety, health, environment and quality (SHEQ) and ImproLogistics departments. Among these 
departments some have failed to achieve their SHEQ goal of no harm to anyone ever; some were able 
to achieve this goal based on the safety performance indicators.  
 3.4  Population and sample selection  
  
The questionnaire was sent to the entire population of 395 respondents to eliminate selection and 
sampling bias in the survey. All 395 employees formed part of the sample size. The population of 395 
employees was given an opportunity to participate in the survey. From the total of 395 participants 
only 124 respondents completed the questionnaire which 31% response rate and it is acceptable for an 
electronic survey. The survey respondents covered almost all the employees in the organisation, from 
individuals working in less hazardous areas to individuals who are greatly exposed to safety risk when 
performing their task. The production supervisors were also included, as they have the important task 
of driving safety culture within the production department, which has high risks exposure. The 
different job classifications included technicians, supervisors, line managers and directors. Each 
respondent has a role to play in ensuring a positive safety culture within the organisation.   
 3.5  Data-collection strategy  
  
Arezes (2015) defines a questionnaire as a tool that consists of questions or open-ended and 
closedended statements to which participants are expected to react. According to Hecker et al. (2014) 
in a structured questionnaire, the fixed instructions and explanations must be fixed such that there  is 
no opportunity for respondents to seek further clarification and thus wording must be clear and specific 
to aid in solving a carefully formulated problem. A quantitative questionnaire of 36 closed-ended 
questions and two open-ended questions was developed for the survey.  
Data-collection strategies ensured neutrality in the current study and consisted of i) unbiased safety 
performance indicators that are measurable, ii) different perspective of several job classes from 
different departments and provinces, iii) privacy to protect the respondents, iv) data confidentiality, 
and v) the inclusion of every individual in the organisation, from technicians to managers. The 
researcher acknowledges that the data obtained from this research cannot be treated as data obtained 
from direct observation; however, the self-reported data aid as „conditional evidence‟ of the existence 
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of certain safety culture types. The researcher can only trust that the respondents responded as honestly 
as possible, and therefore the data cannot necessarily serve as concrete reality. Dejoy et al.‟s (2014) 
recommendations for data-collection methods were taken into consideration. Clear advantages and 
disadvantages of different data-collection methods were reviewed. Due to the fact that ImproChem has 
extended their footprint to Africa and have multiple plants, and that some employees are distributed to 
different customer sites, email questionnaire distribution was selected.   
Management allowed for employees to spare 10 minutes of their time to complete the questionnaire 
during working hours. The self-administering the questionnaire was also considered, because the 
researcher could then clarify any questions the respondent may have had and it also permits a 
maximum response rate; however, due to geographic area that had to be covered, a selfadministering 
the questionnaire could not be the practical.   
The following procedures were followed to collect the data from the respondents:   
  
Step 1: The SHEQ manager was informed in February 2015 about the intent to conduct an SHEQ 
survey. The initial intention was to conduct the survey in the KZN region, due to the fact that the 
Umbongitwini manufacturing plant is located there, where most of the employees were easily 
reachable, which would have allowed the researcher to hand deliver the questionnaire to increase the 
response rate. However, due to the increases in incident rates within the organisation, the need to assess 
the safety culture at each individual location throughout Africa was noted.   
Step 2: The involvement with individuals from SHEQ departments allowed the researcher to obtain 
several instruments of safety culture. The researcher was able to determine different dimensions to be 
assessed. Similar to the research conducted by Chenhall (2010), the researcher decided to administer 
questionnaires that assessed safety culture practices, company values, management‟s level of support, 
the work environment and also employees‟ commitment and level of vigilance when performing their 
tasks.  
Step 3: The questionnaire was developed and administered electronically via email. The consent form 
was attached to ensure that the respondents‟ anonymity is well maintained. The respondents‟ 
responses were kept confidential throughout the research; the researcher did not release the responses 
to the employer. The respondents were also granted freedom not to participate in the survey or 
withdraw without any consequences. Responses to completed questionnaires were sent directly to 
QuestionPro, where the researcher was able to do the analysis.   
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 3.6  Questionnaire design  
  
The first set of questions was designed to assess to what extent the working non-human factors (work 
environment, work design) affect employee participation in ImproChem SHEQ programmes. The 
second set of questions was designed merely to test employees‟ level of understanding of 
ImproChem‟s SHEQ requirements and to assess their level of compliance with the SHEQ 
requirements. To assess employees‟ level of commitment and attitude towards ImproChem‟s safety 
improvements, questions on aspects such as using a questioning attitude when doing day-to-day tasks 
were asked.  
Management‟s level of support was identified as the most important factor to improve safety within 
any organisation, and therefore questions to understand the level of support offered by management 
were asked. Lastly, to gain insights into different ImproChem organisational safety cultures, questions 
on how the overall organisation feels about hiding safety errors were asked. Regarding the 
improvement of ImproChem‟s safety, employees were asked two open-ended questions on what 
safety-improvement strategies are already in place and which safety-improvement strategies can be 
employed to improve safety at ImproChem.  
For the current study, the Likert scale, which is an attitude-response scale used for measuring reactions 
and attitudes in business and management surveys, was used. In the Likert scale answers are placed on 
a scale, ranging from complete disagreement to complete agreement. An option of neutral response is 
also given in the centre of the scale. The questionnaire was designed to incorporate reliable and well-
validated measures of employees‟ level of understanding of and compliance with ImproChem‟s SHEQ 
standards using an itemised rating scale. The questionnaire was more focused on questions that allowed 
the respondents to express their responses using a fivepoint Likert scale. The requirements for the 
respondents were to use a scale of 1 to 5 to score each question.   
 3.7  Validity and reliability   
  
Stellmack (2009) defines validity as the extent to which the facts support that the interpretation of the 
data in a way in which interpretations used is correct In short, validity is a presentation of how true 
and believable the results are. Validity can be tested through posing a sequence of questions and using 
previous research test the accuracy of the measurements.  
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Creswell (2003) points out that numerous threats for validity exist, giving rise to data inaccuracy issues 
or statistical tests or results. These threats are categorised into internal and external threats and 
construct validity and statistical conclusion threats. Stellmack (2009) points out that internal validity 
is the basic requirement to clearly understanding an instrument. Internal validity can be defined as 
threats encountered by the researcher such that they affect the researcher‟s capability to draw 
appropriate inferences from experimental data. Such threats are participants‟ experiences, treatments 
and experimental procedures. Inadequate procedures such as change in a tool, instrument or control 
group during the experiment can raise such threats.  
  
When researchers draw incorrect inferences from the sample data, external validity threats arise. When 
the researcher uses inadequate definitions and from there measures variables, construct validity threats 
arise. Denise et al. (2010) points out that when a researcher draw inaccurate inferences, a statistic 
conclusion threat arises due to the violation of the assumptions used for data collection. Prior to 
sending the questionnaire, the testing bias was eliminated during the piloting of the questionnaire. To 
eliminate analysis bias, SPSS and QuestionPro were utilised, as data analysis is hereby done without 
the researcher‟s manipulation.   
  
According to Golafshani (2003), reliability can be defined as the consistency of the results irrespective 
of the number of times the experiment is repeated. In quantitative research, an instrument is said to be 
reliable if it meets the following criteria:  
  
• The results remain the same when exposed to the same measurement conditions.  
• The dimensions remain stable although the frequency may vary.  
• In a specific given time period the measurements remain similar.  
  
The highest degree of stability shows the highest degree of reliability. Cronbach‟s alpha test is 
commonly used to measure internal consistency; it measures how the set of items is closely related as 
a group. The Cronbach‟s alpha measure for the current study was 0.836, which is an acceptable 
measure of reliability.  
  
 3.8  Administration of questionnaire  
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A total of 36 closed-ended questions and two open-ended questions were developed for the survey and 
the questionnaire was administered electronically. QuestionPro was used to send out the questionnaire. 
The safety manager administered the questionnaire to the respondents. The consent form was attached 
to the questionnaire to ensure that the respondents‟ anonymity is well maintained. The questionnaire 
was sent out on 21 May 2015 and the respondents were given three weeks to respond. A weekly 
reminder was sent to encourage the respondents to complete the survey. The respondents were also 
granted freedom not to participate in the survey or to withdraw without any consequences thereof. The 
respondents‟ responses were kept confidential throughout the research. The researcher‟s intentions 
were clear not to release the responses to the employer, but to share the findings and recommendations.    
 3.9  Data analysis   
  
Quantitative data analysis requires a breakdown to test the hypothesis and the research questions. The 
method to be used for data analysis is determined by the type and quantity of analysis to be performed. 
Various methods of data analysis could be used; however, due to restricted access, quantitative data 
analysis was done using the SPSS version 20 for Windows. Frequency tables were used to describe 
the variables. The data were imported from QuestionPro to the SPSS program to complete the data 
analysis. Descriptive summary measures such as the mean and the mode were used to summarise the 
results. To measure the statistical significance, a p-value of < 0.05 was accepted as a valid measure.   
The next chapter presents the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire. The difference across the 
departments was analysed using the one-way ANOVA for safety practices, values, management‟s 
level of support, employee commitment and level of vigilance. To test for the significance among the 
responses from 11 ImproChem departments, the Kruskal Wallis test was applied.  For p-value less than 
0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. According to 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) the Wilcoxon rank-sum W-test (Mann- Whitney U-test) is suitable for 
analysis of ordinal data, hence it was used this study which contained Likert scale data.  
  
  
 3.10  Conclusion  
  
The methodology utilised for the current study was outlined in this chapter. The researcher chose to 
utilise quantitative data-collection methods for the research due to the advantages of the quantitative 
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data-collection strategy. The survey population was ImproChem employees across Africa. The entire 
population was chosen as a sample size and the questionnaire was used as the survey instrument.   
The questionnaire was designed in line with the objectives. Piloting of the questionnaire was done to 
ensure the questions are clear and understandable before they were administered. QuestionPro was 
used to administer the questionnaire, which was of benefit, as it allowed the researcher to conveniently 
analyse the data using SPSS software, which is interlinked to QuestionPro. The software packages 
provided sufficient statistical tools that allow for valuable data insight. The discussion and data 
presentation are contained in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 4: Presentation of the results  
  
 4.1  Introduction  
  
The most important aspects of any research is data presentation and discussion, as this is the section 
where raw data are converted into meaningful information to address the research objectives. The 
interpreted research information can then add value to the purpose for which the research was 
conducted.   
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the results obtained from the safety survey conducted 
at ImproChem. The survey participation outcomes are presented, also highlighting certain respondent 
statistics. The demographic information is presented. The detailed analysis of factors influencing 
employee participation in workplace safety improvement is provided.  
 4.2   Survey statistics report  
  
A total of 395 questionnaires were distributed, but only 124 respondents completed the 
selfadministered questionnaire. The response rate was therefore 31% (Table 4.1). Table 4.1: 
Summary report of the survey  
   Count  
Number of respondents  395  
Number of respondents who started the questionnaire   191  
Number of respondents who completed the questionnaire  124  
Drop-outs  67  
Participation rate  64%  
Completion rate  31%  
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 4.3  Demographics    
  





Figure 4.1: Gender distribution of respondents (n = 124)  
  
Based on the gender distribution illustrated in Figure 4.1, approximately two-thirds (64%) of the 
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Figure 4.2: Age distribution of respondents   
  
Figure 4.2 shows the age distribution of the respondents. Of these, more than two-thirds of the 
respondents (71%) fell within the 25–44 year age group. The majority of respondents were aged 
between the ages of 25 – 34 years, with 44 (35.5%) participants coming from this group. This was 
followed by age range 35 – 44, with 40 (32.3%) participants. The least represented group were 
participants between the ages of 18 and 24, with only 4 respondents coming from this group. Only 1 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of respondents in departments (n = 124)  
  
Of the eight departments depicted in Figure 4.3, the Energy division had the most responses relative 
to the other departments (41%), followed by the Marketing/Human Capital/ Finance (MHCF) 
department (17.64%) and the Production department (16.13%). The department that was represented 
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 4.4   Objectives  
  
In the sections that follows, the six objectives that the study set out to achieve are discussed. Each is 
presented with central tendency statistics, significance tests and descriptive statistics in the form of 
frequency distribution bar charts. Each of the constructs used to test the reliability of the study 
objectives (as per the questionnaire) was assessed using Cronbach‟s alpha. These are reflected in Table 
4.2.  
Table 4.2 tabulates the alphas of the six constructs used to address the objectives that the study set out 
to achieve. Based on Table 4.2, the combined alpha coefficient for all test statements comprising the 
constructs is 0.836. This indicates that taken as a whole, the reliability of the questionnaire was 
sufficient.   
Table 4.2: Cronbach’s alpha for constructs grouped together by relevant questions  
Objective  Questions  Combined alpha  
The extent to which non-human 
factors influence employee 
safety performance and 
contribute to number of  
accidents   
1a–1e  
0.836  
To evaluate employees‟ level of   
understanding of ImproChem  
SHEQ requirements  
2a–2d   
To evaluate employees‟ level of 
compliance with ImproChem  
SHEQ requirements  
3a–3g  
The evaluate the extent to which 
employees take ownership of the 
ImproChem  
SHE improvement plan   
  
4a–4h   
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To evaluate management‟s level 
of support in ensuring a safe 
working environment   
  
5a–5e  
To evaluate how organisational 
culture influences employee 
participation in ImproChem 




4.4.1 Objective 1: the extent to which non-human factors (working environment) influence employee 
safety performance and contribute to the number of accidents  
  
Based on Table 4.3, it is evident from the medians that in four of the five statements 50% or more of 
the respondents felt that non-human factors were always on par, and it can be inferred that they feel 
these had minimal influence on carrying out their jobs safely and contributed minimally towards the 
number of accidents. Only on the statement “My job often leaves me with little time to think about 
safety” did 50% or more of the respondents‟ reply that their job never leaves them with little time to 
think about safety. A more detailed discussion of the statements is given in the following paragraphs.    
To test the significance in differences between ImproChem departments, the Kruskal-Walls test was 
applied. For the hypothesis testing, if the p-value was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected, 
which resulted in the alternative hypothesis being accepted. The hypothesis for each of the statements 
above was as follows:   
  
  
Ho: The distribution of responses to the statements 1a to 1e is the same across departments.  
H1: There is a difference in the distribution of at least one of the departments’ responses to the 
statements 1a to 1e.  
As shown in Table 4.3, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis is accepted on all counts, as 
in each statement the p-value is greater than 0.05 (i.e. significance is when p < 0.05). The researcher 
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therefore concluded that the distribution of responses across departments for statements on the extent 
to which non-human factors contributed to the number of accidents is similar at the 95% confidence 
level.   
Table 4.3: The extent to which non-human factors influence employee safety performance   








1a. My job often leaves me with little time to 
think about safety  
1  0.6324  0.1928  0.2416  
1b. I use tools that are in good condition  5  0.0992  0.2372  0.1576  
1c. Safe working procedures are readily available 
for each task and machinery  I use  
5  0,0738  0.3088  0.3268  
1d. I use machinery that is in good condition  5  0.1475  0.1201  0.3617  
1e. Emergency procedures are readily available in 
case job-related conditions change  
5  0.3697  0.2497  0.3642  
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Figure 4.4: My job often leaves me with little time to think about safety  
  
As seen in Figure 4.4, more than 50% of the respondents felt that their job gives them sufficient time 
to think about matters pertaining to safety.  25.8% of the respondents felt that their job occasionally 
left them with little time to think about safety.  8% of the  respondents felt that their job always left 
them with little time to think about safety, 3(2.4%) participants felt that it often left them without time, 
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Figure 4.5: I use tools that are in good condition  
  
Figure 4.5 illustrates the responses to the statement “I use tools that are in good condition”. More than 
60% of the respondents indicated that the tools they use are always in a good state. 16% felt that the 
tools that they used were often in a good condition, while almost 17% were not in a position to 
comment. 1 participant felt that their tools were occasionally in a good condition and another felt that 
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Figure 4.6: Safe working procedures are readily available for each task and machinery I use  
  
Based on Figure 4.6, 52 (42%) respondents felt that safe working procedures are readily available for 
each task and machinery that they used. 23.4%  felt that this was often the case, 7.2% felt that this was 
sometimes the case, while 2 (1.6%) participants felt that this was never the case. The remaining 7 
(5.6%) participants chose to remain neutral.  
  
  
Figure 4.7: I use machinery that is in good condition  
  
Figure 4.7 shows the responses to the statement “I use machinery that is in good condition”. In response 
to this statement, 60% of the respondents indicated that this is always the case. 14% felt that this was 
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never the case. 4 (3%) participants opted not to comment, while it was not possible for 19% of the 










Figure 4.8: Emergency procedures are readily available in case job-related conditions change  
  
In response to the statement “Emergency procedures are readily available in case job related conditions 
change”, 72 (58%) of the respondents agreed to the statement. 31 (25%) indicated that this often held 
true, and 8 (6.5%) participants felt that this was occasionally the case. The remaining 13 participants 
either opted to remain neutral (8 participants) or this statement did not apply to them (5 participants).  
  
4.4.2 Objective 2: To evaluate employees’ level of understanding of ImproChem SHEQ requirements   
  
Table 4.4 shows the central tendency statistics and significance tests relating to the construct evaluating 
employees‟ level of understanding of ImproChem‟s SHEQ requirements. Based on the median 
responses to the above statements, it can be said that 50% or more respondents agreed to three of the 
four statements. On the statement “I know what to do in case of an emergency”, 50% or more 
respondents strongly agreed. The most frequently selected response to the first three statements was 
“agree”, while “strongly agree” was the most frequently selected response to the last statement:  
“I know what to do in case of an emergency”.  
Using the Kruskal-Wallis test to detect any significant differences between the distribution of responses 
between the different departments, it was found that there were no statistically significant differences 
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Table 4.4: Employees’ level of understanding of ImproChem’s SHEQ requirements  






2a. I am fully aware of all ImproChem  
SHEQ programmes  
4  0.1049  0.5349  0.9348  
2b. I have received adequate ImproChem  
SHE training  
4  0.1984  0.3580  0.4055  
2c. I  follow safe working procedures 
when performing my tasks  
4  0.8722  0.6616  0.9454  
2d. I know what to do in case of an 
emergency  
5  0.7471  0.6870  0.4348  
*Kruskal Wallis test; +Mann-Whitney U-test  
 
 Response type    
Figure 4.9: I am fully aware of all ImproChem SHEQ programmes  
  
As shown in Figure 4.9, 35.48% of the respondents strongly agreed that they are fully aware of 
ImproChem‟s SHEQ programmes, and 55% agreed that they are fully aware of ImproChem‟s SHEQ 
programmes and 4 (3.2%) were unaware of ImproChem‟s SHE program. The remaining 8 participants 
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Figure 4.10: I have received adequate ImproChem SHE training  
  
As illustrated in Figure 4.10, the majority (84%) of the respondents positively indicated that they 
receive adequate SHE training from ImproChem. 7 participants disagreed to this statement and one 
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Figure 4.11: I follow safe working procedures when performing my tasks  
Figure 4.11 shows that the most frequently selected responses to the statement “I follow safe working 
procedures when performing my tasks” were “agree” and “strongly agree”, with 98.38% of the 
respondents selecting these options. Only 1 participant disagreed and 1 opted to be neutral.   
 
Figure 4.12: I know what to do in case of an emergency  
  
Figure 4.12 depicts that over 95% of the respondents were confident that they know what to do in case 
of an emergency. Only 1 participant indicated that they did not know what to do, while 4 participants 
chose to remain neutral.  
4.4.3 Objective 3: To evaluate employees’ level of compliance with ImproChem SHEQ requirements   
  
Based on Table 4.5, for all the statements, the median indicates that 50% or more respondents selected 
“always” as a response. This response is also the most frequently selected response for each statement 
as per the mode. No statistically significant differences were detected when comparing the distribution 
of responses by department for six of the seven statements constituting this construct. Statement 3a 
(EMPRO‟s Hazard Assessment Tool booklet) and statement 3e (Site risk assessments) were the only 
two statements with statistically significant differences across departments at the 5% level of 
significance. The result showed that the median scores were not similar between male and female for 
statements 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e and 3f. It can therefore be concluded that differences were detected in the 
distribution of responses in at least one department for this particular statement at the 5% level of 
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Table 4.5: Employee level of compliance with ImproChem SHEQ requirements  






3a. Hazard Assessment Tool (HAT) 
booklet  
4  0.0454  0.8156  0.0358  
3b. PPE register  4  0.0955  0.9118  0.1014  
3c. Safety data sheet letter of 
acceptance (LOA)  
4  0.1029  0.4398  0.0107  
3d. EMPRO‟s documented emergency 
plan at customer sites  
4  0.1667  0.6046  0.0206  
3e. Site risk assessments (SRAs)  4  0.0403  0.6400  0.0461  
3f. Driver checklist  4  0.0901  0.6533  0.0157  
3g. Medical assessments  4  0.3324  0.8823  0.6979  
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Figure 4.13: Hazard Assessment Tool (HAT) booklet  
  
The Hazard Assessment Tool (HAT) booklet results indicate that almost 40% of the respondents felt 
that they are always compliant, as indicated in Figure 4.13. 17 respondents felt that this particular (safe, 
health and environment) SHE requirement does not apply to them, probably because of the department 
in which they work, as in general, the HAT booklet is applicable to individuals who work in high-risk 
areas.21.7% respondents indicated that they often comply with the HAT requirement, 16% occasionally 




Figure 4.14: PPE register  
  
The majority of the respondents (56%) indicated that they are always compliant with the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) register, as shown in Figure 4.14. 20% indicated that they were often 










Never Occasionally Often Always N/A 
Response type   
 
66   
  
 
 Response type    
Figure 4.15: Safety data sheet letter of acceptance (LOA)  
  
Figure 4.15 show that approximately 47% of the respondents indicated that they are always compliant 
with the safety data sheet letter of acceptance (LOA). 25.8% indicated that the safety data sheet LOA 
does not apply to them.14 respondents indicated that they are often compliant, 11 participants are 
occasionally compliant and only 7% of the respondents were never compliant with the LOA 
requirement.  
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In terms of EMPRO‟s documented emergency plan at customer sites, 43% of respondents indicated 
that they are always compliant. EMPRO‟s emergency plan was not applicable to 27% of the 
respondents.12 % of the respondents indicated that they are often compliant with 10% occasionally 
compliant and 8% of the respondents are never compliant.  
 
  
Figure 4.17: Site risk assessments (SRA)  
  
Site risk assessment (SRA) was always complied with by a slight majority of the respondents (50.8%) 
as indicated in figure 4.17. Figure 4.17 also shows that almost 18% of respondents felt that they were 
often compliant, 7.3% were occasionally compliant, while almost 5% were never compliant. The 
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Figure 4.18: Driver checklist  
  
Figure 4.18 show that 45% of the respondents were always compliant with the updating of driver 
checklists. 15% of the respondents felt that they were often compliant, 12 % felt that they were 
occasionally compliant and it was never the case with 7% .Driver checklist compliance did not apply 
to 20% of the respondents.  
 
Figure 4.19: Medical assessments  
  
Figure 4.19 illustrates that the vast majority (73.4%) of the respondents indicated that they are always 
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and almost 6.5% were occasionally compliant. 2 participants indicated that they were never compliant, 




    
4.4.4 Objective 4: The evaluate the extent to which employees take ownership of the ImproChem SHE 
improvement plan   
  
As tabulated in Table 4.6, 50% or more respondents indicated that they often take ownership of 
ImproChem‟s SHEQ improvement plan in three of the eight statements comprising this construct (viz. 
4b, 4d and 4e) as per their medians. The median responses also indicate that for five statements (4a, 4c, 
4f–4h), 50% or more respondents indicated that they always take ownership with respect to these 
statements. The most frequently selected response as per the mode for each statement mirrors that of 
the median responses in all but one statement (4e). According to the mode for statement 4e, the 
respondents most often indicated that they always discuss safe practices for a job, along with associated 
hazards, with their team. The result showed that the median scores were not similar between male and 
female for statements 4d, 4e and 4g.  
In the testing for difference in the distribution of responses between the 11 departments, no statistically 
significant differences were found in seven of the eight statements tabulated above. The only statement 
that showed significant differences was statement 4g: “I am my brother‟s keeper”. It can therefore be 
concluded that statically significant differences exist in at least one of the departments in the 
distribution of responses to the statement “I am my brother‟s keeper” at the 95% confidence level.  
Table 4.6: The extent to which employees take ownership of the ImproChem SHEQ  
improvement plan  
Statement  






4a. I take immediate corrective action when  
I observe an unsafe act   
5  0.4319  0.4782  0.0541  
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4b. I routinely review job procedures to 
make sure they are understood and 
followed  
4  0.0728  0.7070  0.0890  
4c. I use judgement and stay alert for 
underlying causes of unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions   
5  0.1408  0.7668  0.1926  
4d. I use a questioning attitude on the job, 
asking myself what injuries could occur if  
4  0.1870  0.8107  0.0269  
the unforeseen happens      
4e. My team and I discuss safe practices 
required for the job and the associated 
hazards  
4  0.1954  0.2780  0.0037  
4f. I use all my senses (total observation) of 
the surrounding area when performing my 
job  
5  0.1965  0.6231  0.1975  
4g. I am my brother‟s keeper   5  0.0034  0.5350  0.0220  
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Figure 4.20: I take immediate corrective action when I observe an unsafe act  
  
As depicted in Figure 4.20, the majority of respondents (61.3%) indicated that they always take 
immediate corrective action when they observe an unsafe act. This was followed by 30.7% of the 
respondents that indicated they are often compliant and 3 participants stated that they were occasionally 
compliant. 7% participants chose to remain neutral.  
  
 
Figure 4.21: I routinely review job procedures to make sure they are understood and followed  
  
Figure 4.21 shows that most frequently the respondents indicated that they often review job procedures 
to ensure that they are understood and adhered to. This is evidenced by 43.55% of the respondents 
selecting this option.28.23% participants indicated that they always reviewed job procedures, 13 
participants occasionally did, while 6 (4.84%) never did. The remaining 16 (12.9%) opted to remain 
neutral.  
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Figure 4.22: I use judgement and stay alert for underlying causes of unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions  
The majority of the respondents (54%) indicated that they always use judgement and stay alert for 
underlying causes of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions (Figure 4.22). This was followed by 40% that 
indicated that they were often compliant and 4% indicated that they occasionally complied. 3 
participants chose to stay neutral.  
   
 
  
Figure 4.23: I use a questioning attitude on the job, asking myself what injuries could occur if 
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As can be seen in Figure 4.23, an equal number of respondents indicated that they either often or always 
use a questioning attitude in anticipation of unforeseen injuries. These two response categories 
represent 87.1% of the responses for this statement. 7 participants indicated they occasionally use a 
questioning attitude and 1 participant indicated that they never adopted such an attitude. The remaining 
8 participants chose to remain neutral.  




Figure 4.24: My team and I discuss safe practices required for the job and the associated 
hazards  
  
Figure 4.24 shows that 80% of the respondents indicated that they discuss safe practices and associated 
hazards, with 6.4% respondents indicating that they occasionally did. Only 5 participants stated they 
never discuss safe practices and 11 participants chose to remain neutral.  
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 Response type    
Figure 4.25: I use all my senses (total observation) of the surrounding area when performing 
my job.  
  
As illustrated in Figure 4.25, the majority (58.87%) of the respondents indicated that their senses are 
always heightened when performing their jobs. 32% indicated that they often used all their senses with 
regards to their surroundings when performing their duties. 6 participants occasionally used all their 
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Figure 4.26: I am my brother’s keeper  
  
As shown in Figure 4.26, most respondents (62.9%) felt that they are always their brothers‟ keeper. 
22% indicated that they were often their brother‟s keeper, 8.87% occasionally looked after their 





Figure 4.27: I reinforce safe work practices  
  
Most respondents (61%) indicated that they always reinforce safe work practices and 31% indicated 
that they often did, and 3% indicated that they occasionally did. The remaining participants remained 
neutral.  
4.4.5 Objective 5: To evaluate management’s level of support in ensuring a safe working environment   
  
Based on Table 4.7, “always” was the most frequently selected response to all five statements 
comprising this construct, as per their modes. The medians indicate that 50% or more respondents felt 
that management always supports initiatives that ensure safe working conditions for four of the five 
tabulated statements. Statement 5d, “Remove barriers to safe working conditions”, was split between 
50% or more respondents feeling that management either always or often supports the removal of 
barriers to safe working conditions. There were also no statistically significant differences observed 
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Table 4.7: Management’s level of support in ensuring a safe working environment  






5a. Value employee safety above all 
priorities  
5  0.8196  0.2461  0.1905  
5b. Believe we can achieve AECI goal 
of “No harm to anyone ever”  
5  0.5912  0.0925  0.9759  
5c. Respond timely to our safety 
concerns  
5  0.8995  0.3993  0.4737  
5d. Remove barriers to safe work 
environment  
4,5  0.9489  0.1475  0.9006  
5e. Reward safety performance  3  0.2745  0.1603  0.9958  




Figure 4.28: Value employee safety above all priorities  
  
As can be seen in Figure 4.28, 67.4% of the respondents felt that management always values employee 
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number 1 priority, and 1 participant indicated that management occasionally did so. 7 participants opted 




Figure 4.29: Believe we can achieve AECI goal of “No harm to anyone ever”  
  
Figure 4.29 show that 60.48% of the respondents indicated that management always believes that they 
can achieve the AECI goal. 33% felt that management often believed that this goal could be achieved, 
while 2 participants indicated that management offered no support at all in this regard. 6 participants 
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Figure 4.30: Respond timely to our safety concerns  
  
In total, 55% of the respondents felt that management always responds timely to their safety concerns 
and 29% felt that management often responds timely (Figure 4.30). 4 participants indicated that 
management occasionally did and 1 participant felt that they never did. The remaining 15 participants 
remained neutral.    
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Figure 4.31 illustrates that 50% of the respondents felt that management always removes barriers to a 
safe working environment. 33% of the respondents felt that management often removed such barriers 
and 4.84% felt that they occasionally did. 2 participants indicated that management never removed 
such barriers and the remaining 13 participants chose to remain neutral.    
 
  
Figure 4.32: Reward safety performance  
As can be seen in Figure 4.32, the statement on the rewarding of safety performance appears to be the 
most contested, with increased numbers of respondents being responding in the “never”, “occasionally” 
and “neutral” response categories, relative to previous responses. 28.23% respondents felt that 
management always rewarded safety performance. 19.35% indicated that management often rewarded 
safety performance, 16.13% participants indicating that management occasionally did; and  





4.4.6 Objective 6: To evaluate how organisational culture influences employee participation in 
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Table 4.8 shows that respondents most often agreed to statements 6a, 6c and 6d. They also most often 
strongly agreed to statement 6e i.e. that “No job is urgent to the extent of compromising my own 
safety”. However, they strongly disagreed with statement 6b, indicating that they believe that there is 
no gain at all to be derived from covering up SHE errors. The median scores indicate that 50% or more 
respondents agreed to statements 6a, 6d and 6e. However, 50% or more disagreed about advantages 
being derived from covering up SHE errors. At least 50% of the respondents remained neutral to 
statement 6c, “People are recognised for their safety performance”. The result showed that the median 
scores for statement 6c is significantly different among different departments (p = 0.0056). Statistically 
significant differences between the distribution of department responses were detected only for 
statement 6c at the 5% level of significance. This indicates that differences existed in at least one of 
the departments‟ responses to the statement “People are recognised for their safety performance”.  
Table 4.8: Influence of organisational culture on employee participation in ImproChem safety  
measures  







6a. People in the organisation are often 
afraid of making SHE-related errors  
4  0.6613  0.8773  0.3332  
6b. There are advantages to covering up  
SHE errors  
2  0.5679  0.2315  0.2487  
6c. People are recognised for their safety 
performance  
3  0.0056  0.5380  0.5396  
6d. People are encouraged to express their 
ideas and opinions about safety  
4  0.0705  0.1747  0.4886  
6e. Our motto is “No job is urgent to the 
extent of compromising my own personal 
safety”  
4  0.5918  0.6387  0.1660  
*Kruskal Wallis test; +Mann-Whitney U-test  
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Figure 4.33: People in the organisation are often afraid of making SHEQ-related errors  
  
Figure 4.33 illustrates that 75% of the respondents agreed that employees are afraid to make SHErelated 
errors. 24 % strongly agreed to this statement, 4% disagreed and 2% strongly disagreed. The remaining 
19% of respondents remained neutral.  
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Figure 4.34 shows that 65.32% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there are advantages to 
covering up SHE errors.  A further 26% also disagreed with this statement. 12% agreed and 3% strongly 
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Figure 4.35: People are recognised for their safety performance  
Figure 4.35 shows that only 45.16 % of the respondents agreed that people are recognised for their 
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Figure 4.36: People are encouraged to express their ideas and opinions about safety    
  
Figure 4.36 shows that most often the respondents agreed (74.19%) that people in the organisation are 
encouraged to express the ideas and opinions about safety. 6% disagreed and 2 participants strongly 
disagreed. The remaining 19% of respondents chose not to commit themselves.  
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It can be deduced from Figure 4.37 that 81.45% of the respondents responded positively with regard to 
the fact that no job is too urgent so as to compromise their personal safety. 3 participants strongly 











The respondents were asked to indicate which safety mechanisms are in place to improve safety 
performance. As far as mechanisms that are in place to ensure that safety performance is improved, 
most often the respondents indicated that shared learning from “accident investigations”, “near-miss 
reporting” and “incident reports” was in place. Their responses are summarised in Table 4.9.   
Table 4.9: Mechanisms in place to improve safety performance at ImproChem    
Mechanism  Frequency  Percentage  
7a. Collaborative safety – peer-to-peer interventions  73  59  
7b. Compliance with regulatory requirements  101  81  
7c. Near-miss reporting and sharing the learning  106  85  
7d. Accident investigation and sharing the learning  108  87  
7e. Meaningful safety performance recognition  68  55  
7f. Incident reports and sharing the learning  106  85  
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The respondents were asked to recommend ways to improve safety performance. The most prominent 
suggestions were that “Leadership at all levels should drive the change in safety culture” (22.14%) and 
that a “No name, no blame culture” (21.89%) should be adopted (Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10: Suggested mechanisms that could be added to improve safety performance  
Suggested mechanisms  Frequency  Percentage  
8a. Toolbox talks discussion (employees to also conduct some 
sessions)  
66  16.42  
8b. Safety performance reviews  69  17.16  
8c. Enhancing employee involvement and participation in proactive 
initiatives  
78  19.40  
8d. Leadership at all levels driving the change in safety culture  
(leadership safety)  
89  22.14  
8e. Behavioural-based safety – peer to peer (No name, no blame culture)  88  21.89  
  
4.5  Conclusion  
  
The respondents appeared to be satisfied with their workplace environment; however, they held 
different views with regard to the availability of safe working and emergency procedures. The overall 
level of management support is good, as the respondents indicated that management responds timely 
to their safety concerns. However, the respondents felt that management can also benefit from the 
bottom-up communication approach, and not the top-down approach as applied. This kind of 
communication can also change the overall organisational safety culture, where employees can feel 
free to report safety incidents and accidents, promoting a supportive and innovative culture at 
ImproChem. Rewards and recognitions were also found to be different in different departments. A 
















Chapter 5: Discussion  
5.1  Introduction  
  
The study was intended to evaluate factors that influence employee participation in workplace safety 
programs at ImproChem and to recommend safety improvements that can be implemented to achieve 
the AECI goal of “No harm to anyone ever”. This study serves as a foundation for further safety studies 
that can be conducted within the organisation to formulate recommendations within the identified areas. 
The study looked at different ImproChem departments distributed across different regions in Africa.  
The study was done to determine whether organisational values and practices are the predictors of 
safety performance. This study examined dissimilar safety culture dimensions across different 
departments. The competing values framework was utilised to measure safety culture strengths and 
congruencies across ImproChem departments as an extension of the study conducted by Chenhall 
(2010).  
This chapter discusses the resulted presented in chapter 3 and 4 in order to answer the following 
research questions:  
• Research question 1: Does the ImproChem workplace environment (non-human factors) 
affect employee safety performance?  
• Research question 2: How well do ImproChem employees understand ImproChem 
safety, health environmental and quality (SHEQ) requirements?  
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• Research question 3: How well do ImproChem employees comply with ImproChem 
SHEQ requirements?  
• Research question 4: Are the employees provided with sufficient support to reduce safety 
incidents?  
• Research question 5: Are the employees committed to improve safety within the 
organisation?  




The influence of employee level of understanding and compliance with ImproChem safety standards, 
employee attitude and commitment to safety, leadership styles, safety culture, non-human factors (work 
environment) were measured through the distribution of questionnaire.  
5.2  Role of the work environment (non-human factors)  
  
The first objective was to evaluate the extent to which the work environment affects employee 
participation in workplace safety programmes. A 5-point likert scale ranging from never (1) to always 
(5) was used to assess the influence of the work environment. From the results it was found that 23% 
of the respondents felt that safe working procedures are often available rather than being always 
available for the employees to carry out their tasks in a safe manner. Of the respondents, 25% also 
indicated that there were times where the emergency procedures are not available. It can therefore be 
concluded that non-human factors have an impact on employee safety performance. That was an 
indication that the work environment had barriers that hinders employee participation in ensuring that 
their tasks are performed safely.  
Lack of safe working procedures indicated that employees have limited knowledge on how to handle 
tools, machinery and carry out their daily activities effectively without increasing the risk of occurrence 
of accidents. To ensure safe task execution, standard safe working procedures for hazardous tasks need 
to be developed and the necessary steps should be clearly outlined. Safe working procedures provide 
employees with consistent and important information of what is expected of them with regard to safety. 
Safe working procedures have a big role in ensuring that complex tasks are carried out in a safely 
manner. A gap was identified at ImproChem where there are insufficient safe working procedures.   
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The study conducted by Zakaria et al. (2012) also found that workplace design and lack of procedures 
contribute to accidents in the workplace. To improve the current situation, employee involvement in 
the development of safe working procedures is essential. According to Golafshani (2010), this can 
improve employees‟ motivation levels with regard to taking ownership of safety. The safe working 
procedures can be updated at varying frequencies to ensure it is relevant to that particular task. Over 
and above this requirement, the procedures should be administered in the language the employee can 
easily understand.   
  
  
5.3  Employee understanding of ImproChem SHEQ requirements  
  
Sufficient training is the main driver to reduce incidents by empowering employees with the necessary 
art and science of hazard recognition and elimination. It is important to thoroughly train the employees 
so they can perform their tasks safely and are encouraged to participate in all SHE initiatives (Haung 
et al., 2015). To evaluate employee understand of ImproChem SHEQ requirements a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) was used.  
Health and safety legislative organisations emphasise fundamental safety practices, which include 
safety training. The safety training is aimed at increasing employee knowledge and understanding of 
ImproChem SHEQ requirements and standards. Among the respondents, 3.2% indicated they were 
unaware of some of the ImproChem safety improvement programmes, while 7% indicated that they 
have not received adequate safety training. It can be concluded that the respondents felt they require 
additional training. On-the-job training can assist in increasing the employee safety confidence level in 
the field. Zakaria et al. (2012) also emphasise providing employees with the training specific to the job 
they do. They further state that employees should be trained in the use of equipment and be provided 
with training manuals specific to the tools with which they work.  
According to the study conducted by Watcher (2013), safety training indicates employee perception 
with regard to the training programmes developed by their organisation. The quality of training can 
positively influence employee participation in workplace programmes to improve safety. There are 
substantial variations in designing and delivering safety training to employees. At ImproChem 
employees are provided with the basic safety training to train them to adhere to minimum compliance 
objectives. In addition to the basic safety training, ImproChem may consider providing on-the-job 
safety training. On-the-job safety training can be 20 hours per year, which can be divided into two-hour 
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increments to ensure that employees are empowered with necessary skills of hazard recognition, 
evaluation and control. In summary, the following can be done:   
• All employees are provided with formal safety training specific to their job.  
• Employee safety training integrates essentials of hazard recognition and avoidance.  





5.4  Employees compliance with ImproChem SHEQ requirements   
  
The extent to which employees adhere to safety policies, standards, legal obligations and procedures is 
referred to as compliance (Arenze et. al 2015). Compliance is also a reduction of incidents and accidents 
in the work place. Safety compliance was measured with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from never (1) 
to always (4).The results in chapter 4 (figure 4.13), revealed that 40% of the respondents felt that they 
were always compliant and  9% of employees the indicated they never compliant with regards to the 
HAT booklet. The HAT booklet applied only to employees who worked in high risk areas hence 17% 
of the respondents felt that this particular SHE requirement did not apply to them since they are less 
exposed to hazardous activities. Employees assess the risk using the HAT booklet and apply necessary 
measures to eliminate, substitute, and use engineering controls or administrative controls to reduce the 
risk level to allow safe job execution.  
PPE is the last line of defence employees can use to ensure they are protected when performing their 
duties. From the respondents 20% indicated that they were often compliant, 13% were occasionally 
compliant, and 2.42% indicated that they were never compliant. A policy oriented culture can be 
applied to re-enforce the use of correct PPE when required. Application of the behavioural based safety 
program at ImproChem can yield positive results by changing employee mind-set in ensuring that 
safety is given first priority (Haung et al., 2015). Compliance with the letter of acceptance (LOA) was 
satisfactory. The LOA serves as a precautionary measure which informs ImproChem customers of all 
the ImproChem chemicals used at each particular customer sites. Only the sales team was expected to 
comply with this requirement since they are based at customer sites.  
The same was applicable with the EMPRO‟s, not all employees expected update the EMPRO‟s. From 
the responses 8% of the respondents indicated that they were never compliant, these employees may 
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require further understanding of the importance of updated EMPRO‟s so they will be encouraged to 
comply. The sales team currently conduct site risk assessment on annual basis and majority of the sales 
team complied. The site risk assessments serve as a tool to measure and control risks associated with 
specific tasks on site (Kanentkar & Chibs 2015). Over and above the unit checks that are conducted on 
daily basis frequent site assessments can improve the workplace safety since conditions change timely. 
Increasing the frequency of risk assessment can ensure the documented unit conditions correspond with 
exactly what is in the unit.  
  
The driver checklist which was only applicable to individuals who drive company vehicles revealed 
that 7% of the employees are still not compliant with this requirement. The checklist ensures employees 
assess the condition of the vehicles before they embark on a journey, over and above ImproChem 
provides the employees with defensive driving skills where they are trained to engage all their senses 
when driving on the road. The high rate of vehicle related incidents and fatalities experienced at 
ImproChem might have influenced the by the employees who are non-complaint with this requirement. 
A study conducted by Molis (2014) also indicated high rate of vehicle related incidents which were 
due to employee non-compliance with the company standards. To reduce the vehicle accidents, 
employees have to conduct proper vehicle checks and inform the employer if the vehicle requires 
maintenance.  
Employee wellness plays a major role in ensuring employees are fully engaged with their day-to-day 
activities. Medical assessment and drug testing ensure the employees are physically and mentally fit 
for their job. This reduces potential accidents that may occur if employees were to engage in activities 
they are not physically fit/mentally for or if they carried out their activities under the influence of 
alcohol. There was a positive response regarding compliance with the medical assessments only 2 
participants indicated that they are never compliant. A study conducted by Masia (2011) found that that 
job-related work stress has negative effect on professional welfare and professional work. Those 
findings were similar to the current study where some accidents were due to fatigue from working long 
hours without proper rest. Employee wellness programs at ImproChem were developed to reduce work 
related stress and ensure employees take care of their well being. Medical assessments are done on 
annual basis, the immediate supervisors can provide necessary support by reminding the employees 
when their medicals are about to expire. Developing systems that will prompt the employee when the 
medical assessments are due can ensure 100% employee participation and compliance.  
  
 







5.5  Employees commitment to ImproChem safety programs  
  
To measure the extent to which the employees take ownership of the ImproChem SHE programs and 
are committed to improve organisational safety, a 5-point likert scale ranging from never(1) to always 
(5) was used. As depicted in chapter 4(figure 4.20) majority of respondents (61.3%) indicated that they 
always took immediate corrective action when they observed an unsafe act. Only 7% opted to remain 
neutral, from the analysis it is clear that employees do take necessary actions to protect their fellow 
colleagues. Employees who showed commitment were also compliant; commitment has positive effect 
on compliance with the rules and policies of the organisation. These findings were consistent with the 
studies conducted by (Clarke, 2010 and Chenhall, 2010).Frequent review of job procedures is essential 
to maintain a safe work environment. There was an increase in the number of participants who chose 
to remain neutral to the question of ensuring review of job procedures. 16% of the employees do not 
make time to review their procedures that may be due to the lack of available safe working procedures 
for certain activities.  
The majority of participants (54%) indicated that they always used judgement and stayed alert for 
underlying causes of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. Participants indicated they apply their 
judgement to assess the risk associated to the jobs they perform, In addition to that, ImproChem can 
consider offering on the job training to enhance the skills of the employees with regards to hazard 
recognition. An equal number of participants indicated that they either often or always used a 
questioning attitude in anticipation of unforeseen injuries. Employees indicated that they assess the 
situation adequately enough to prepare themselves for unforeseen circumstances. With sufficient 
emergency response procedures, the injury rate can decrease significantly.   
Tool box talks are vitally important since this is where all employees are aligned with regards to the 
tasks that will be carried out on that particular day. Majority of the respondents indicated that they 
always discussed safe practices and associated hazards, than respondents who indicated that they often 
did. Only 4% of the respondents indicated they never did the toolbox talk, although the percentage 
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might be lower it might have a negative impact to the number of incidents. Departments who ensured 
they conduct toolbox talks every morning indicated low incident rates, these findings were similar to 
those of the study conducted by Tsai (2010). All the employees should take initiative to ensure toolbox 
talks are done prior any activity to raise the awareness of any potential hazards.  
  
  
Situational analysis plays a very important role in accident prevention as employees become aware of 
the co-inciding activities happening around their vicinity. The results proved that employees take extra 
precautions by doing total observations of the surrounding area. 58.87% of the respondents indicated 
that they are always vigilant when doing their tasks. According to the OSHACT (1996), each employee 
is responsible for their health and safety and the health and safety of other employees that may be 
affected by their activity. 62.9% of the respondents felt that they were always their brothers‟ keeper. 
An excellent safety culture has been instilled to the employees to take reasonable care of each other. 
Employees felt empowered enough to reinforce safe practices, such culture positively impact on 
employee safety.   
5.6  Management level of support: Motivation and safety rewards   
  
A total of 15.32% of the respondents indicated there are no rewards associated with achieving a good 
safety record, while other respondents indicated that it is rare for management to reward safety 
performance. There is no clear individual safety goals linked to performance incentives. Safety 
recognition can be done in different ways, rather than providing momentary incentives. According to 
Goomas (2014), a positive safety culture is enhanced through constant feedback to employees 
regarding their safety performance. This is often referred to as a learning culture. Hofmann (2011) 
points out that safety behaviour promotion reflects employees‟ perception about the type of rewards 
gained for safety behaviour and the importance of rules and procedures fulfilment. This indicates that 
the rewarding of safety performance can improve safety within the organisation and can motivate 
employees to improve organisational safety.  
According to an article in ESH Today (2013), providing positive feedback to employees with regard to 
their safety performance is a powerful tool to improve safety performance. The article indicates that 
the leadership at Miliken changed their leadership style and started celebrating and recognising their 
employees‟ hard work and dedication. This was done through safety celebratory events, where safety 
cheerleaders deliver safety cheers to the employees as they enter the plant, which was one of the ways 
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management was sending a positive message to employees thanking them for their safety performance. 
The article indicates that safety performance results improved drastically, such that the injury rate 
improved by one point in a space of one year, after which the Miliken total injury indication rate was 
at an average of 0.63.   
In the current study, the ImproChem production department respondents, which were among the 
28.23% that indicated they are recognised for their safety performance, appeared to be at a level at 
where they take ownership of safety and show more commitment to safety performance compared to  
the other departments, where there are no safety incentives and recognition. ImproChem should also 
strive to find ways of recognising employees for their safety inputs and performance to boost the overall 
safety climate within the organisation.  
  
According to the four safety cultures proposed by the competing values framework (Diaz, 2007), 
leadership should motivate employees to achieve safety excellence. The leadership appears to be 
cooperating by removing barriers and responding timely to employees‟ safety concerns. However, 
some respondents indicated that bottom-up communication rather than top-down communication 
approach should be practised.  
  
5.7  Organisational safety culture: Dissimilarities in organisational safety cultures  
  
The present study found that there are dissimilarities in ImproChem‟s safety culture among the 
departments. This was indicated by the responses to the question on safety performance recognition, 
where an increased number of respondents responded in the “never”, “occasionally” and “neutral” 
response categories, relative to other responses. The comparison across all departments showed a 
significant difference in the safety cultures. As discussed, employees in the production department 
agreed that they are rewarded for safety performance, while other departments felt that there are no 
rewards attached to safety performance. The difference in safety culture may be due to the fact that 
other departments are based at customer sites, hence they are encouraged to adopt customer safety 
standards.   
The nature of the business makes it a challenge for the safety department to clearly communicate and 
track safety performance throughout all the departments. The production department seems to have 
benefited from safety rewards and recognition, as it is based at the ImproChem manufacturing plant 
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where it is easier to track performance and clearly set and communicate SHEQ goals. Earlier studies 
by Chenhall (2010) and Kim et al., (2011) also found significant differences in safety cultures between 
different plants of similar organisations. In these studies, the employee levels of satisfaction and 
autonomy was also found to be different, which were then linked to each department‟s safety 
performance.   
Department structures were also examined, and the findings indicated that some of the departments had 
centralised decision-making processes and closed communication (Kim et al., 2011). A similar finding 
was noted at ImproChem, where 15% of the respondents indicated that they see a benefit in covering 
up safety related errors. 70% of the respondents indicated that they are afraid of making safety related 
errors – this may be due to the culture of blame and punishment.  
According to Sun et al. (2012), a reporting culture is a necessity for excellent safety-performing 
organisations. Employees should feel free to report safety incidents, knowing that they will receive the 
necessary support where needed. When a culture of fear exists, employees tend to lose interest in taking 
part in improving organisational safety. A reporting culture and a just culture can be adopted – a no 
name, no blame culture where employees can report incidents and near misses with the aim of learning 
from the incidents and avoiding the occurrence of similar incidents in the future.  
A similar culture of rewarding employees for safety performance must be adopted across all 
departments. Over and above, management should consider rewarding near-miss reporting to 
encourage employees to take part in making ImproChem a company where safety is the number one 
priority.  
5.8  Conclusion  
  
It is important to create a culture in which employees take ownership of their own safety and the safety 
of their fellow employees. Employees have to be encouraged to come up with innovative ideas to 
improve safety in the workplace. Sufficient support from the management team is the most critical 
aspect in achieving safety goals. Most importantly, collaboration among all levels within the 
organisation would ensure that ImproChem is a safe place to work. More detailed recommendations of 










Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations   
  
6.1  Introduction  
  
Safety and accident prevention have continuously been a challenge for most organisations, including 
ImproChem. There are many aspects that affect individual safety performance, which in turn influence 
overall organisational safety performance. There were latent variables that could not be clearly defined 
in this study due to their complexity and broadness. Many studies that have been conducted have also 
failed to capture safety culture and safety climate in it completeness (Chenhall (2010). This is merely 
due to the fact that it is difficult to measure safety dimensions and individual attitudes through 
questionnaires.   
6.2  Conclusion  
  
Some respondents indicated there are inadequate safe working procedures, as some tasks are performed 
without safe working procedures. Safe working procedures are meant to assist employees to carry out 
their tasks in a stepwise, safe manner. The overall condition of machinery used appears to be good, as 
attested to by the majority of the employees. The respondents indicated a high level of compliance with 
SHEQ requirements; only a minority indicated that they occasionally comply with SHEQ requirements. 
Only a few of the respondents indicated they do not receive adequate safety training. The respondents 
appeared to have a positive attitude towards safety, as they do more than what is expected of them with 
regard to interventions when they notice unsafe behaviours. Sixty-two per cent indicated they take 
reasonable care of the health of their fellow employees.  
Leadership style reflects employee perception of the behavioural style of their line managers and 
immediate supervisors. The respondents indicated that ImproChem management should practise more 
listening and motivate employees to achieve the safety goals. Most respondents indicated that there are 
no rewards and recognition for safety performance. From the responses it was noted that there is a 
significant difference in safety culture across the departments. The respondents indicated that there are 
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advantages of covering up safety errors, indicating that employees are afraid of making errors related 
to safety.  
  
  
6.3  Limitations  
  
The significant limitation was to obtain the TRIR per department in order to assess the safety 
performance and link it to the safety culture per department. The researcher decided to conduct a 
quantitative study and administered the questionnaire using QuestionPro. The limitation was the low 
response rate; however, a reminder was sent to the respondents until a 32% response rate was achieved, 
which is considered sufficient for electronic questionnaires. In addition, the researcher had to assume 
that the respondents provided honest responses and drew meaningful conclusions.  
6.4  Recommendations  
  
The following are recommended based on the study findings:  
  
6.4.1. Adopt a common safety culture throughout the organisation.  
Synergy in safety culture needs to exist, where the SHEQ department can clearly communicate SHE 
goals and track safety performance. Every employee should have clearly defined safety key 
performance indicators to which safety performance incentives can be linked.  
6.4.2 Increase employees’ motivation level by promoting employee involvement and influence   
Employees should have influence on the designing of safe work procedures and programmes and 
safety-management system practices by being actively involved in facilitating safe behaviours and 
attitudes. Direct involvement in the development of safe working procedures will increase motivation 
levels and employees can take ownership of safety, adopt safe working practices and encourage other 
employees as well.  
6.4.3 Improve the work environment by conducting pre- and post-task safety reviews and audits  
All routine and non-routine tasks require some element of health and safe risk assessment. It is 
important to develop the discipline to constantly review safety considerations of non-routine and 
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routine tasks, as this allows for full cognitive concentration on situational awareness and task-related 
safety elements. Post-task reviews promote the application of lessons learned for future purposes.  
Continuous safety improvement is achieved.  
6.4.4 Improve organisational safety culture by:  
a) Hiring for safety  
It is essential to hire employees who have intrinsic safety values, as this reduces the likelihood of 
incidents and accidents. Selective safety hiring has to be part of the recruitment process of new 
employees. Safety hiring can consist of elements such as a practical physical capability test, for 
example when an employee will be required to use man power (a suitable fitness test also needs to be 
done). Substance abuse testing should be part of tests conducted prior to hiring and a standardised 
process to instil safety values prior to hiring should be developed.  
b) Improving communication and safety information sharing  
Communication and information sharing are important where accident and incident reduction is the 
main goal. The ImproChem safety department ensures that all the employees with access to the 
company computers receive incident reports; however, employees with no access to ImproChem email 
end up not receiving the communication. To close the loop, accident and incident reports and safety 
newsletters can be discussed in the weekly safety meetings prior to the discussion of that week‟s safety 
focus topic. It should be supervisors‟ responsibility to ensure that all employees reporting to them are 
aware of the safety learning to ensure the safety incident does not occur again.  
  
6.5  Implementation of recommendations to solve the research problems  
  
ImproChem‟s safety-management systems have improved, such that most of the above-mentioned 
recommendations are already in place in some departments. To reduce the TRIR and achieve the AECI 
goal of “No harm to anyone ever”, ImproChem should have similar safety-management systems and 
one culture throughout the organisation. Safety-management systems should be the uniform – a system 
whereby the SHEQ department is able to communicate the safety goals and track employee 
performance in line with the goals and objective should be developed.  
A stepwise approach to the implementation of recommendations can be followed; concurrently, 
employee safety performance can be measured and reviewed on a monthly basis to increase safety 
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accountability. Organisational safety quarterly reviews should be done as a pro-active approach to 




6.6  Recommendations for future studies  
  
The following are recommended for future safety studies:  
• The current study was focused more on the evaluation of factors that influence employee 
participation in ImproChem safety programmes. Safety culture theories that emerged from the 
literature review were then applied to assess the impact of different factors on safety 
performance. The study can be expanded by looking at individual psychological aspects that 
can be evaluated and monitored to minimise safety incidents.      
• Future research can select one safety-improvement programme and evaluate the results before 
and after the programme has been employed.  
• Future studies can evaluate the return on safety investment and propose alternatives that can 
ensure ImproChem reaps maximum benefits in conjunction with the safety-related investments.  
  
6.7  Conclusion   
  
There were few identified factors that influence employee participation in ImproChem safety 
programmes. The majority of the respondents are satisfied with the overall organisational culture, 
workplace condition and the support provided by management to ensure employee safety within the 
organisation. The respondents attested to a positive safety climate, although some felt that it would be 
of benefit to recognise and reward safety performance. Employee awareness of ImproChem‟s safety 
standards and the level of compliance were also satisfactory. More focus can be directed to increasing 
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APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
For research with human participants  
INFORMED CONSENT LETTER  
  
Note to researchers:  Notwithstanding the need for scientific and legal accuracy, every effort should be 
made to produce a consent document that is as linguistically clear and simple as possible, without 
omitting important details as outlined below. Certified translated versions will be required once the 
original version is approved.  
  
There are specific circumstances where witnessed verbal consent might be acceptable and 
circumstances where individual informed consent may be waived by HSSREC.  
  
MBA Research Project  
Researcher: Samke Mabele (0839630173)  
Supervisor:  Muhammad Hoque at (031 260 8690 )  









1.1 Information Sheet and Consent to Participate in Research  
  
Date:  31 March 2015  
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Dear Respondent,   
  
My name is Samkelisiwe Euphrasia Mabele from an MBA student, at the Graduate School of Business 
and Leadership, of the University of KwaZulu Natal. Email address:   
samke.mabele@improchem.co.za.  
  
You are being invited to consider participating in a study that involves research on an investigation of 
factors influencing employee participation in workplace safety programs, the case of ImproChem. The 
aim and purpose of this research is to explore and recommend specific variables, personal attitudes and 
non-human variables that affect employee participation in workplace (ImproChem) safety 
improvement.  
  
The study is expected to enroll 395 participants from ImproChem Sales, Manufacturing Finance, 
Health, and Safety and Environmental department based in Durban (KwaZulu Natal). It will involve 
the following procedures, participating on an electronic questionnaire of 30 closed questions and 3 
open questions which will be administered via email. The duration of your participation if you choose 
to enroll and remain in the study is expected to be four weeks.   
   
The study may involve the risk of discomfort as the questions need to be answered as honest as possible.  
We hope that the study will create the following benefits, reduce non-human factors that contribute to 
unsafe work environment and also improve ImproChem workplace safety. Your participation in this 
project is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the project at any time with no 
negative consequence. There will be no monetary gain from participating in this survey. Confidentiality 
and anonymity of records identifying you as a participant will be maintained by the Graduate School 
of Business and Leadership, UKZN. The data will be securely stored on the researcher‟s ImproChem 
laptop where only the researcher will have access.    
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This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee (approval number :HSS/0135/015M ).  
  
In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you may contact the researcher (Samke Mabele) at 
samke.mabele@improchem.co.za, contact number 0839630173 or my supervisor Muhammad Hoque 
at 031 260 8690 or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, contact 




HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION   
Research Office, Westville Campus  
Govan Mbeki Building  
Private Bag X 54001   
Durban   
4000  
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA  
Tel: 27 31 2604557- Fax: 27 31 2604609  
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za     
The survey should take you about 20minutes to complete.  I hope you will take the time to complete 







MBA Research Project  
Researcher: Samke Mabele (0839630173)  
Supervisor:  Muhammad Hoque at (031 260 8690 )  
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Research Office: Mariette Snyman 031-2603587  
  
  
CONSENT   
  
I …………………………………………………… (Name) have been informed about the study 
entitled an investigation of factors influencing employee participation in workplace safety programs, 
the case of ImproChem by Samkelisiwe Euphrasia Mabele.  
  
I understand the purpose and procedures of the study to explore and recommend specific variables, 
personal attitudes and non-human variables that affect employee participation in workplace 
(ImproChem) safety improvement.  
  
I have been given an opportunity to answer questions about the study and have had answers to my 
satisfaction.  
  
I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time 
without affecting any of the benefits that I usually am entitled to.  
  
   
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact 
the researcher at samke.mabele@improchem.co.za contact number 0839630173.  
  
If I have any questions or concerns about my rights as a study participant, or if I am concerned about 
an aspect of the study or the researchers then I may contact:  
   
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION  
Research Office, Westville Campus  
Govan Mbeki Building  
Private Bag X 54001   
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Durban   
4000  
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA  
Tel: 27 31 2604557 - Fax: 27 31 2604609  
Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za   
  
Additional consent, where applicable  
  
I hereby provide consent to:  
  
Audio-record my interview / focus group discussion YES / NO  
Video-record my interview / focus group discussion YES / NO  
Use of my photographs for research purposes YES / NO  
____________________        ____________________  
Signature of Participant                            Date  
  
  
____________________     _____________________  
Signature of Witness                                Date  
(Where applicable)       
  
  
____________________     _____________________  
Signature of Translator                            Date  
(Where applicable)  
Questionnaire  
Please provide your back ground information  
 





2. What is your age 
____________ 
3. Which department do you work in? 




Please answer every question by ticking the number that best represents how you feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers.  
 
My job often leaves me with little time to think about safety  1  2  3  4  5  
I use tools that are in good condition  1  2  3  4  5  
Procedures are readily available for each task I have to perform  1  2  3  4  5  
I use machinery that is in good condition  1  2  3  4  5  
Emergency procedures are readily available in case job related 
conditions change  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
Strongly  Strongly Disagree  Agree  
 
I am fully aware of all ImproChem SHEQ program  1  2  3  4  5  
I have received adequate ImproChem SHEQ training  1  2  3  4  5  
 
I  follow safe working procedures  when performing my tasks  1  2  3  4  5  
I know what to do in case of an emergency  1  2  3  4  5  
 
Hazard Assessment Tool(HAT) booklet  1  2  3  4  5  
PPE register  1  2  3  4  5  
Safety Data Sheet Letter of Acceptance ( LOA)  1  2  3  4  5  
Never  Always  
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never  Occasionally Often Always  N/A 
1 2 3 4 5 
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EMPRO‟s (Documented emergency plan at customer sites)  1  2  3  4  5  
Site Risk Assessments (SRA)  1  2  3  4  5  
Driver Checklist  1  2  3  4  5  
Medical Assessments  1  2  3  4  5  
 
I take immediate corrective action when I observe an unsafe act  1  2  3  4  5  
I routinely review job procedures to make sure they are understood 
and followed  
1  2  3  4  5  
I use judgment and stay alert for underlying causes of unsafe acts and 
unsafe conditions   
1  2  3  4  5  
I use a questioning attitude on the job, asking myself what injuries 
could occur if the unforeseen happens.  
1  2  3  4  5  
Me & my team discuss safe practices required for the job and the 
associated hazards  
1  2  3  4  5  
I use all my senses (total observation) of the surrounding area when 
performing my job  
1  2  3  4  5  
I am my brother‟s keeper  1  2  3  4  5  
I reinforce safe work practices  1  2  3  4  5  
 
Value employee safety above all priorities  1  2  3  4  5  
Believe we can achieve AECI goal “No harm to anyone ever”  1  2  3  4  5  
Respond timely to our safety concerns  1  2  3  4  5  
Remove barriers to safe work environment  1  2  3  4  5  
Reward safety performance  1  2  3  4  5  
 
People in the organization are often afraid of making SHEQ related 
errors  
1  2  3  4  5  
There are advantages of covering up SHEQ errors  1  2  3  4  5  
People are recognized for their safety performance  1  2  3  4  5  
People are encouraged to express their ideas and opinions about safety  1  2  3  4  5  
Our motto is “No job is urgent to the extent of compromising my 
own personal safety”.  
1  2  3  4  5  
Never  Always  
1 2 3 4 5 
Never  Always  





1 2 3 4 5 
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Please answer the questions below by circling the appropriate answer/s, to assist ImproChem achieve 
the AECI goal “No harm to anyone ever”:  
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that safety performance at ImproChem is improved?  
1. Collaborative safety – Peer to peer interventions 
2. Compliance with regulatory requirements 
3. Near miss reporting and sharing the learning 
4. Accident investigation and sharing the learning 
5. Meaningful safety performance recognition 
6. Incident reports and sharing the learning 
What mechanism should be added?  
1. Toolbox talks discussion (employees to also conduct some sessions). 
2. Safety performance reviews 
3. Enhancing employee involvement and participation in proactive initiatives. 
4. Leadership at all levels driving the change in safety culture. 
5. Behavioral based safety –Peer to peer (No name, no blame culture).
 
 
 
